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Abstract
We document contemporaneous dierences in the aggregate labor supply of married couples
across 18 OECD countries. Relative to their US counterparts, European married men work on
average 9 to 17 percent, and married women in Western and Southern Europe 26 and 31 percent
fewer hours. Married women in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe however work almost as many
hours as US married women. We nd that a model of joint household decision-making can
largely replicate these facts if the full non-linearity of labor income taxes and the tax treatment
of married couples are taken into account. Going to a system of strictly separate taxation would
increase labor supply of married women by more than 100 hours annually in a third of our
sample countries.
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The international labor supply of married men and women diers substantially. While married men
in the core age group 25 to 54 work on average between 9 and 17 percent fewer hours in Europe
than in the US, the picture is substantially more heterogeneous for married women. Married
women in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia work only 3 and 9 percent fewer hours, respectively,
than US married women, whereas married women in Western and Southern European work 26
and 31 percent fewer hours, respectively.1 In other words, for Scandinavia and Eastern Europe,
hours worked dierences to the US are half the size or less for married women than for married
men, while for Southern and Western Europe they are twice the size or more for women than for
men. The cross-country correlation of average hours worked of married men and married women
is essentially zero, while countries with low hours worked by married men are also countries with
low hours worked by singles, independent of the gender (the respective cross-country correlations
are 0.75 and 0.70). Explaining these large dierences in the labor supply behavior of married men
and married women with linear (average marginal) taxes { a prominent and successful predictor
in explaining aggregate hours worked dierences in the literature pioneered by Prescott (2004) {
seems challenging. Even if women have a higher labor supply elasticity than men, the relative
country ordering of dierences to the US should be similar for both genders, possibly with larger
dierences for women, which is not consistent with the data.
In this paper, we build a simple model of joint household decision making that incorporates
international dierences in wages and taxation, and show that it is in fact largely able to replicate
the above mentioned international dierences in the hours worked of married men and married
women. The key to this success is the explicit modeling of non-linearities in the labor income tax
code together with the tax treatment of married couples, which ranges from completely joint to
completely separate taxation. This tax treatment interacts with the progressivity of the tax system
in aecting labor supply decisions of both spouses. Of the countries in our sample, Germany,
Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal and the US use some variant of a system of joint taxation of
married couples, and France uses a system of family splitting. All the other countries have systems
based on individual taxation of spouses, which nevertheless often feature some elements of joint
taxation through specic exemptions or alike, see Pearson and Binder (2011). To give a concrete
example, consider the case of Germany, which features a very clear system of joint taxation. The
incomes of husband and wife are summed up and divided by two, and the household tax burden
is then determined as the sum of the tax burdens on these two hypothetical equal incomes. Due
to the progressivity of the German tax code, this lowers the overall tax burden of the household,
1The country groups are made up as follows: Scandinavia { Sweden and Norway; Western Europe { Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, United Kingdom; Eastern Europe { Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland; Southern Europe { Greece, Italy, Spain. Portugal and Denmark are also included in our sample but we
discuss them separately as they dier along two important dimensions from the other countries in their respective
region.
1but increases the marginal tax rate of the secondary income earner, whose contribution to the
household income is less than half and who would therefore face a lower marginal tax rate under
individual taxation. By contrast, it decreases the marginal tax rate of the primary income earner.
Thus, the treatment of couples in labor income taxes leads to additional non-linearities in the tax
code compared to singles, which dier substantially for husband and wife.
The paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we combine dierent micro data sets
to present new facts about the international labor supply of dierent demographic subgroups in 18
OECD countries in the 2000s (excluding the recent crisis years), focusing on gender and marital
status, and on the core age group 25 to 54. Secondly, we document international dierences in
the tax treatment of married couples and take the full non-linearity of the labor income tax code
into account in our analysis. We incorporate these dierences into a quantitative macro model and
show that the model is largely able to replicate the hours worked dierences relative to the US
for European married men and for married women in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and Western
Europe, but is somewhat less successful for Southern European married women.
Our quantitative framework is based on the model of joint labor supply of married couples
developed in Kaygusuz (2010), Guner et al. (2012a), and Guner et al. (2012b), which features an
extensive and an intensive margin of female labor supply. As typical for cross-country studies in
macroeconomics, we calibrate the model to match the labor supply behavior in a benchmark coun-
try, namely the US. We rst show that the model provides a remarkably good t for the time series
of labor supply in the US from the late 1970s on, and then predict labor supply behavior in the
remaining 17 European countries of the sample, holding preferences xed but using the country-
specic economic environment. The latter comprises non-linear labor income taxes, consumption
taxes, wages, specically the gender wage gap and educational premia, and the education distribu-
tion plus the degree of assortative matching into couples. For the non-linear labor income taxes,
we use OECD tax modules which capture country specic features of average and marginal income
tax rates of married couples in detail, along with all types of exemptions, tax credits and benets,
etc., as well as the tax treatment of married couples.
The model correctly predicts lower, but relatively homogeneous hours worked of married men
in Europe compared to the US. For married women, the model is able to replicate the small hours
worked dierences between the US and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, explains two thirds of
the large hours worked dierence between the US and Western Europe, and 40 percent of the
dierence between the US and Southern Europe. Crucial for the results is the fact that the US
features a system of joint taxation of married couples, while most Scandinavian, Eastern, and
Southern European countries rely on separate taxation, with a mixture of both systems in Western
Europe. Higher consumption and average labor income tax rates in Europe mostly lead to lower
optimal hours relative to the US, an eect which we nd for both married men and married women.
However, the dierent tax treatment of married couples and the implied dierences in the marginal
2tax rates of the primary (male) and secondary (female) income earner imply higher hours worked
of married women in the majority of European countries than in the US, counteracting the eect
of the average tax rate to a large degree. This eect is on average absent in Western Europe, where
many countries also feature strong elements of joint taxation. Dierences in the gender wage gap
and educational premia across countries play a relatively minor role in explaining cross-country
dierences in hours worked of married men and women. Breaking our overall results further down
into an extensive and an intensive margin for women, the model replicates the facts closely for
Eastern Europe and reasonably for Southern Europe. Despite the model's success in predicting
total hours worked per married woman, it however cannot replicate the high employment rates and
low hours worked per employed woman in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Through the lens of
our model, this is not surprising. The eects of taxes and wages are qualitatively the same for
the extensive and intensive margins. We discuss potential explanations, which are not part of our
model environment as they are hard to quantify, e.g. easier possibilities to work part-time (because
of dierent regulation), in the results section.
The key importance of the tax treatment of married couples can be best illustrated with a
concrete example. Take the case of the US, a country with low average tax rates and joint taxation,
Germany, a country with high average tax rates and joint taxation, and Sweden, a country with
high average tax rates but with individual taxation. In Table 2, we show that the average tax
rate of a household in which the husband works the mean hours of US married men is with 20.5%
substantially lower in the US than in Germany and Sweden with 31.0% and 32.8%, respectively. Yet,
the marginal tax rate that a wife faces if she goes from not working to working the average hours of
US married women is fairly similar in the US and Sweden, with 29.1% and 30.1%, respectively, but
drastically higher in Germany with 50.3%. Married men in Germany and Sweden work roughly the
same hours, and around 15% fewer hours than in the US, while married women in Sweden work only
slightly fewer hours than US married women (4%), but German married women work 34% fewer
hours. The model is able to replicate these observations both qualitatively and quantitatively
because it features both dierences in the average tax rate and in the tax structure, combining
the progressivity and the tax treatment of couples. The Swedish tax structure alone, keeping
government revenues constant, predicts 10 percent higher hours worked of married women in Sweden
than in the US, while the German tax structure predicts 13 percent lower hours worked than in
the US, allowing us to replicate the high hours in Sweden and low hours in Germany.
A series of papers (Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006), Rogerson (2008), Rogerson (2009), Oha-
nian et al. (2008)) have shown that dierences in average tax rates can largely explain dierences
in the developments of aggregate hours worked across European countries and the US, with the
exception of Scandinavia. We dierentiate explicitly between consumption and labor income taxes,
and show that it is crucial to take the full non-linearity of labor income tax schedules into account.
Two features that we abstract from in our model are capital income taxes and retirement incen-
3tives through social security programs. McDaniel (2011) shows in a dynamic model that labor
income and consumption taxes are much more important than capital income taxes and productiv-
ity growth in explaining the dierent developments of total hours over time across countries. Erosa
et al. (2012) and Wallenius (2013) analyze international dierences in social security programs,
and specically in retirement systems and conclude that they can explain large international dif-
ferences in the timing of retirement, while having almost no eect on labor supply behavior before
retirement, i.e. in the age group we focus on.2
High hours worked in Scandinavia despite high consumption and labor income taxes there have
been raised as a puzzle in the literature. Ragan (2013), and in a similar fashion Ngai and Pissarides
(2011), suggest government subsidies in sectors that serve as complements to home production
(e.g. child care) as the main explanation for this apparent puzzle, a point that was already raised
theoretically by Rogerson (2007). They therefore explicitly model home production in addition to
market work and distinguish between the taxation of sectors that are substitutes or complements
to home production. By contrast, we can replicate Scandinavian hours well, and even better than
Ragan (2013), by taking the non-linearity of the labor income tax code into account.3 Moreover,
we show in the data that Scandinavian labor supply is especially high exactly for married women:
married women work 9 percent less than US married women in Scandinavia, while single women
work 22 percent less, married men 17 percent less, and single men 8 percent less. Our approach
thus oers a complementary explanation to Ragan (2013) and Ngai and Pissarides (2011) for high
hours worked by Scandinavian married women.
The paper most closely related to ours is Chakraborty et al. (2012). They build a comprehensive
life-cycle model with idiosyncratic income risk to investigate the cross-country variation in hours
worked for married and single men and women. Besides taxes, they concentrate on exogenous
marriage and divorce probabilities as driving forces of labor supply dierences, but do not model
international dierences in divorce legislation and alimony regulations. Chakraborty et al. (2012)
estimate polynomial tax functions for married couples and thus allow for some non-linearity, but
base their estimates on the sum of household earnings, and thus cannot exploit the dierential
eects of tax progressivity vs. tax levels on husbands and wives under systems of joint vs. separate
taxation. This also does not allow them to talk about dierences between current systems and
systems of separate taxation. Their model t is worse than ours for men and women with the
exception of married women in Portugal and Denmark. This again stresses the importance of
modeling the tax system in all its details.
2By starting at the age 25, we also abstract from dierences in education systems and youth unemployment rates.
3Our predictions for hours worked in the three Scandinavian countries are o by 1 percent for Sweden, 10 percent
for Norway, and 12 percent for Denmark, whereas the corresponding numbers in Ragan (2013) are 39 percent, 41
percent and 50 percent in her benchmark calibration, and 24 percent, 28 percent and 41 percent in the specication
with government subsidies. Note, however, that our data and predictions refer to married men and women in the
core age group, while Ragan's sample comprises all men and women aged 15 to 64. We cannot directly compare our
results to Ngai and Pissarides (2011), as they do not predict total hours, but only relative shares in dierent sectors.
4Besides the literature on international labor supply dierences, our paper connects to the large
literature documenting the increase in labor supply of married women in the US over the last
decades. Within this literature, Guner et al. (2012a) and Guner et al. (2012b) focus explicitly
on the taxation of married women. In an elaborate quantitative life cycle model, they nd that
going from joint to individual taxation would increase the labor supply of married women in the
US substantially. We conduct the same experiment for the US and our results line up closely
with theirs. Crossley and Jeon (2007) study in a dierence-in-dierences approach a Canadian
tax reform in 1988 which reduced the \jointness" of the labor income tax system, while Eissa
(1995) and Eissa (1996) analyze in a similar approach the eects of signicant decreases in the top
marginal income tax rate in the US in the 1980s. These three studies conclude that the relevant
tax reforms increased the labor supply of wives of well-earning husbands signicantly. Kaygusuz
(2010) evaluates the eects of the same US tax reforms on the labor supply of married women with
a quantitative model.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the micro data sources, explains the
construction of the relevant data series, and presents our sample selection criteria. Section 3 shows
some facts on the labor supply of married couples. The following section introduces the model,
as well as its parametrization and calibration. Section 5 quanties to which degree international
dierences in taxation and wages can explain dierences in hours worked, and investigates the
relative role of the various model inputs, specically of the non-linear labor income tax schedule.
Section 6 analyzes the country-specic consequences in going from the current tax system to one of
strictly separate taxation of married couples. The subsequent section compares our results explicitly
to a more standard calibration in the literature that takes linear taxes as a model input. Section 8
shows that our results are robust to controlling for the presence of children in the household and a
series of other robustness checks, before the last section concludes.
2 Micro Data
2.1 Data Sets
We work with three dierent micro data sets to construct hours worked, namely the European
Labor Force Survey, the Current Population Survey, and the German Microcensus. A detailed
description of the data work, as well as a comparison of the resulting aggregate data to similar
series from the OECD and the Conference Board, can be found in Bick et al. (2014).
2.1.1 European Labor Force Survey
The European Labor Force Survey (ELFS) is a collection of annual labor force surveys from dif-
ferent European countries, with the explicit goal of making them comparable across countries.
Our ELFS sample comprises the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the East-
5ern European countries Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the Southern European countries
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the Western European countries Austria, Belgium, France,
Ireland, Netherlands, and the UK.4 The sample size of the ELFS varies across countries and within
a country over time, but is always of considerable magnitude, with the minimum annual sample
size being more than 15,000 for Denmark, a country with roughly 5.5 million inhabitants. The
weeks used as reference week in the survey vary from country to country and year to year, mostly
covering a period of between 1 and 12 weeks in the rst half of the year up to the year 2004, and
the entire year from 2005 on. Appendix A.1 describes some data modications that we have to
apply to specic years and countries of the ELFS.
2.1.2 Current Population Survey
For the US, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is a monthly survey of around
60,000 households. Specically, we work with the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups data
provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.5 This data set includes only those inter-
views in which the households are asked about actual and usual hours worked, namely the fourth
and eighth interview of each household. The data cover the entire year, with the reference week
always including the 12th of a month, and comprise individual data for about 300,000 individuals
per year.
2.1.3 German Microcensus
The German Microcensus covers a one percent random sample of the population of Germany and
is an administrative survey. Participation is mandatory. We use the scientic use les, which are a
70 percent random subsample of the original sample. This leaves us with a sample size of between
400,000 and 500,000 individuals per year. Until 2004, the Microcensus was carried out in the last
week without a public holiday in April or the rst week without a public holiday in May, and from
2005 on continuously over the year.6
2.2 Calculation of Average Hours Worked per Person
For each individual, we have information on four key variables: usual hours worked in the main
job during a working week, actual hours worked in the main job during a specic reference week,
actual hours worked in additional jobs during the reference week, and reasons why the individual
4The ELFS covers even more transition countries as well as Finland and Switzerland, which we however exclude
from the analysis because of data limitations along other dimensions.
5All information on these data les can be found on http://www.nber.org/data/morg.html.
6From 2002 on, data from the German Microcensus are used also as input into the European Labor Force Survey,
but before 2002 Germany is missing from the anonymized ELFS available to researchers.
6worked more or less hours than usual in the reference week.7
The main challenge in generating average annual hours worked per person lies in the fact that the
reference weeks are not spread representatively across the entire year. This is especially a concern
for vacation days and public holidays, which show systematic seasonal patterns. The reference
weeks mostly exclude typical vacation periods and weeks with major holidays, which might lead
to an overestimation of total hours worked. In the companion paper Bick et al. (2014), we nd
evidence that vacation days and public holidays are underreported even during the years in which
reference weeks ought to cover the entire year. Therefore, we collect information on the number
of vacation days and public holidays by country and year from external data sources. The main
disadvantage from using external data sources is that we cannot account for heterogeneity in the
population when it comes to vacation days.
To generate annual hours worked per person, we rst construct individual weekly hours worked
by adding up actual hours worked in the reference week in all jobs. To make the data comparable
across countries, we cap the sum of usual or actual hours worked in all jobs at 80, which is the
largest possible value for usual or actual hours worked in the main job in the ELFS. For individuals
who report having worked less hours than usual in the reference week due to vacation or public
holidays, we use usual hours worked instead of actual hours worked. We then multiply these weekly
hours worked by 52 minus the weeks lost due to vacation days and public holidays, i.e. the number
of these days divided by ve, in the respective country, and then average over all individuals.8
2.3 Sample Selection
We include only married individuals into the sample. There are a few countries which dierentiate
between marriage and a civil union. In this case, the ELFS makes it explicitly clear that every
respondent who is treated for tax purposes as \married" should indicate married as the civil status.
This is for example the case in the Netherlands, where individuals living in a civil union are recorded
as married in the ELFS. Next, we include only couples for which both partners are observed and
t our sample restrictions. Since clear identiers for husbands and wives are missing for many
years and countries, we dene couples consistently as two people of opposite sex who are both
married and live in the same household, and drop households in which more than two married
adults live. We focus on couples in which both husband and wife are aged 25 to 54. Since we
are mainly interested in the role of taxation in explaining international dierences in hours worked
7For the CPS, we have usual hours worked in the main job and actual hours worked in all jobs in the reference
week, i.e. we cannot distinguish between overtime work in the main job and actual hours worked in any additional
job in the reference week.
8In Bick et al. (2014), we construct hours worked for all individuals aged 15 to 64, and compare average hours
worked per employed and employment rates generated from our micro data sets to the data series provided by the
OECD and the Conference Board. Overall, the dierences between our statistics and the macro data are small:
deviations in the employment rate amount to less than 2 percentage points in most cases, and deviations in hours
worked per employed to less than 5 percent. As described in Bick et al. (2014), capping the data does not have a
signicant impact on the overall average of hours worked.
7of married couples, we focus on the core age group and avoid discussing international dierences
in the education systems, degrees of youth unemployment, and early retirement programs. We
concentrate on the sample period 2001 to 2008. We use a sample period of more than one year
and do not further analyze the time series in order to avoid that cross-country dierences might
be driven by uncorrelated business cycles. The choice of the exact sample period is caused by the
availability of the OECD tax modules. Last, since we model heterogeneity through dierences in
education levels, we exclude individuals with missing information on own education or partner's
education.
There are three reasons why a married individual aged 25 to 54 might be dropped from our
sample, namely rst because we cannot identify the partner due to more than two married adults or
no other married adult living in the household, second because the partner might be younger than
25 or older than 54, and third because education information might be missing for the respondent or
the partner. Table A.1 in the appendix reports the percentage of observations dropped because of
these restrictions. The percentage is always larger for women than for men, because it is more likely
for women that the partner is older than 54. Variation across countries arises because of variation
in the number of missing education observations, variation in the age structure in marriage and
age at marriage, and variation in the number of married adults living in one household.9
3 Hours Worked of Married Couples
Table 1 shows some statistics on hours worked per person by gender and marital status over the 18
sample countries and averaging over the years 2001 to 2008. On average, married men aged 25 to
54 work around 730 hours more than married women in the same age group. Single women work
190 hours more than married women, and single men 280 hours less than married men.10 While
married women are thus clearly the group with the lowest hours worked, they exhibit the largest
cross-country standard deviation in mean hours worked per person across countries: in fact, the
standard deviation of hours worked of married women is more than 70 percent higher than the ones
of the other three demographic groups, while the coecient of variation is even more than twice as
large, and the variance of log hours an order of magnitude bigger. Married women contribute on
average 23 percent of total hours worked, but account for 29 percent of the variance of total hours
9E.g. Poland, which has the largest number of observations dropped, exhibits an unusually large percentage of
individuals married to someone younger than 25, as well as an unusually large number of households consisting of
three or more married adults. In the data for the Scandinavian countries, it is in most years impossible to identify
households. Therefore, the only reason why married individuals might be dropped is missing information on their
own education, leading to the small fraction of observations dropped in Table A.1. We describe in Section 4.2.3
how we impute the matching into couples for Scandinavia using data from the EU Statistics of Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC).
10The dierence in hours worked between single and married women persists regardless of the presence or absence
of children or preschool children, but is smaller for women with children than for women without children; for details
see Bick et al. (2014).
8Table 1: Cross-Country Statistics on Annual Hours Worked by Gender and Marital Status (Ages
25-54)
Men Women
Country Married Single Married Single
Mean 1761.6 1484.5 1028.2 1217.0
Standard Deviation 104.2 108.8 179.5 96.6
Coecient of Variation 0.059 0.073 0.175 0.079
Var(log hours) 0.003 0.005 0.033 0.006
worked across countries. Moreover, the cross-country correlation of hours worked of married men
with the one of single men or single women is 0.75 and 0.70, respectively, while the correlation with
hours worked of married women amounts only to 0.05. Thus, there is clearly something special
about married women, and investigating the sources of the dierent behavior of married men and
married women is of great interest if one wants to understand international dierences in hours
worked.
Since from now on we focus on married couples, the issue of selection into marriage arises. While
we do not model this selection, we report in Figure A.1 in the Appendix the fraction of women
in the core age group who are married. It amounts on average to 64 percent, with a standard
deviation of 0.075. The extremes are Sweden with 48 percent of women being married, and Poland
with 77 percent. For the majority of countries, the fraction of married women lies between 60 and
70 percent. Any potential selection bias could go in either direction, but we nd it reassuring that
the cross-country correlation of the fraction of married women in our core age group with married
women's hours worked is virtually zero. Similarly, the tax treatment of couples, i.e. whether a
country employs a system of joint or separate taxation, is not correlated with the marriage rate.
Chade and Ventura (2002) and Chade and Ventura (2005) show in a quantitative equilibrium model
of the marriage market for the US that the marriage rate would barely change if the US would
replace the current system of joint taxation with one of separate taxation.
Figure 1 shows average hours worked of married women (dark bars) and men (light bars) aged
25 to 54 over the period 2001 to 2008 for all eighteen countries in our sample in a bar chart
(the corresponding numbers are presented in Appendix Table A.2). The countries are grouped
into ve regions, namely the US, Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), Scandi-
navia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland,
Netherlands, United Kingdom), and Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal). The order-
ing of the regions is according to the mean hours worked per person of married women, and the
countries within each region are ordered alphabetically.
Hours worked of married men are highest in the US, followed closely by Greece, the Czech
Republic, and Ireland. At the lower end of the sample are Norway, Sweden, Hungary, and France.
9Figure 1: Average Annual Hours Worked Per Person of Married Women and Men (Ages 25-54)
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Norwegian married men work 350 hours less than, or only 82 percent of, US married men. There is
no clear pattern in terms of married men's hours worked among Western, Southern, Eastern, and
Northern European countries.
By contrast, for married women there is a clear regional pattern of hours worked per person,
which are high in the US, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia with 1240, 1200 and 1160 hours,
respectively, and much lower in Western and Southern Europe with 910 and 960 hours. Portugal
is a notable exception, which despite being a Southern European country actually features the
highest hours worked of married women.11 Western Europe is somewhat divided with Germany,
Ireland and the Netherlands having relatively low hours worked, comparable to Italy and Spain,
whereas France, Belgium, the UK, and Austria have higher hours worked; but still below the level
of Scandinavian and Eastern European countries. The lowest hours worked arise in Italy with 750
hours, 490 hours less than, or only 61 percent of, US married women. The graph reects the nding
of Table 1 that the dierences in hours worked of married women are much larger than for married
men.
Figure 2 decomposes hours worked per person of married women into the extensive margin, i.e.
the employment rate, and the intensive margin, i.e. hours worked per employed (the corresponding
numbers can be found in Appendix Table A.3). An interesting pattern emerges here: the regions
with high employment rates, Scandinavia and Western Europe, tend to have low hours worked per
11Without Portugal, Southern Europe features lower hours of married women than Western Europe.
10Figure 2: Average Employment Rates (ER) and Hours Worked per Employed (HWE) of Married
Women (Ages 25-54)
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employed, while the regions with low employment rates, Eastern Europe and especially Southern
Europe, exhibit high hours worked per employed married woman. While Scandinavia and Eastern
Europe thus both exhibit high hours worked of married women, they show very dierent behavior
in the decomposition into an intensive and an extensive margin. The same is true for Southern and
Western Europe, which both exhibit low hours worked per married woman, but again are clearly
distinguishable in the decomposition into an intensive and an extensive margin. The US looks in its
decomposition similar to Eastern and Southern Europe. Figure A.2 in the appendix shows the same
decomposition into both margins for married men. There is little variation in employment rates of
married men, which lie always around 90 percent. The only exceptions are Hungary and Poland,
where lower employment rates are driven by older married men and are probably a phenomenon
of the transition from Socialism to Capitalism. As a consequence of this relative homogeneity and
the high employment rates of married men, we do not model an extensive margin for married men
explicitly, and report the decomposition into both margins from now on only for women.
One might be worried that part of the international dierences in married women's labor supply
across countries comes from dierential eects of children on mothers' hours worked due to dierent
child care availability and cost, cultural factors, etc. In Appendix Table A.4, we show country-
specic dierences in married womens' labor supply relative to the US rst for our baseline sample
(presented in the two previous gures) and then if we exclude women with children of preschool
11(0-4) or school ages (5-14). Since for Scandinavia we do not have information on children in the
household, we have to omit the Scandinavian countries from this analysis. As the table shows, there
are indeed dierential eects of children on labor supply, but they are relatively minor. Focusing
on childless women decreases hours worked of married women in Eastern Europe and Southern
Europe compared to the US by 2 and 5 percentage points, respectively, but increases the ones in
Western Europe by 4 percentage points. This indicates that the negative \eect" of children on
married women's hours worked is larger in Western Europe than in the US, but smaller in Southern
and Eastern Europe. In Section 8.1, we calibrate and compare our model to these data and neither
the qualitative nor quantitative results change.
Last, we assume in our analysis that dierences in hours are driven by the supply side, and
not by the demand side. However, international dierences in unemployment rates could indicate
dierent possibilities of individuals to nd a job. To see how large this eect could potentially
be, we take the extreme view that all unemployment dierences are driven by the labor demand
side. We therefore exclude all unemployed individuals (and partners of unemployed individuals)
from the sample, and recompute our labor supply measures. The resulting measures, expressed as
dierences to the US, are shown in Table A.5. Relative to the US, male and female hours worked
per person increase in Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, and in both cases the increase is
larger for married women than for men. However, the changes are not dramatic: hours worked per
married woman dierences to the US increase from -3% to +3% in Eastern Europe, and from -23%
to -19% in Southern Europe.12
4 Model
4.1 A Model of Joint Household Labor Supply
We build a static model of married couples' hours decisions to investigate in how far cross-country
dierences in consumption and labor income taxes, and education-gender-specic wage premia
contribute to the cross-country dierences in male and female labor supply presented in the previous
sections in Figures 1 and 2. The model framework is based on Kaygusuz (2010) and features a
maximization problem of a two person household which jointly determines male and female labor
supply.13
There is a continuum of married households of mass one. Each household member exhibits
one of three possible education levels, denoted by x 2 flow;medium;highg for women and by
z 2 flow;medium;highg for men, which determine the oered wages wi
f(x) and wi
m(z), where
12These results are in line with unemployment rates obtained from the World Development Indicators. Some
countries, especially Poland, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, and Belgium, suer from very high youth unemployment
rates during the sample period, but unemployment rate dierences for the core age group are less dramatic.
13Guner et al. (2012a) and Guner et al. (2012b) embed the same preference structure in a life-cycle setting to
evaluate dierent tax policies within the US.
12the superscript i represents a given country. We denote the fraction of households of type x;z by
i(x;z) with X
x
X
z
i(x;z) = 1: (1)
Households draw a utility cost of joint work q from a distribution (qjz) which depends on the
husband's education level. This cost is only incurred if the wife participates in the labor market,
and thus introduces an extensive margin choice for women. We abstract from modeling an explicit
extensive margin choice for men since their participation rates in our sample are above 90 percent
and display only little variation across countries. The draw q can be interpreted as a utility loss due
to joint work of two household members originating from, for example, inconvenience of scheduling
joint work, home production and leisure activities, or spending less family time with children,
see Kaygusuz (2010). It captures residual heterogeneity across households - conditional on the
husband's education level - regarding the participation choice. For each household x;z, there exists
a threshold level  q(x;z) from which onwards the utility costs of working are so high that the woman
chooses not to work, i.e. hf = 0.
The household faces two types of taxes, namely a consumption tax rate c and a non-linear labor
income tax l, which depends on both spouses' gross incomes, as well as the number of children in
the household k. The maximization problem of a type fx;zg household in country i is given by
max
hm;hf

ln c   h
1+ 1

m   h
1+ 1

f   qIhf>0

(2)
s.t. c =
yhh   l
(1 + i
c)
+ T (3)
yhh =wi
m(z)hm + wi
f(x)hf (4)
l =i
l(wi
m(z)hm;wi
f(x)hf;ki) (5)
where Ihf>0 takes the value one if the wife is working and zero otherwise, c represents household
consumption, yhh represents gross household income, and l the household's income tax liability,
which depends on the gross incomes of husband and wife, as well as the number of children in the
household ki through tax credits and/or child benets. T represents a lump-sum transfer from the
government which redistributes a share i 2 [0;1] of all government revenues:
T =
i
1 + i
c
X
x
X
z
i(x;z)
Z 1
 1
i
l(wi
m(z)h
m(q);wi
f(x)h
f(q);ki)(qjz)dq
+i
c
Z 1
 1
 
wi
m(z)h
m(q) + wi
f(x)h
f(q)

(qjz)dq

;
(6)
13where  denotes the optimal hours choice given the draw of q.14 As e.g. in Prescott (2004) and
Rogerson (2008), households do not internalize that their choices aect the transfer, but their
expectation about the transfer is consistent with the realization.
As usual in the literature explaining aggregate hours worked dierences between Europe and
the US, consumption and labor supply are assumed to be separable, and utility from consumption is
logarithmic. Therefore, cross-country dierences in mean wages are irrelevant, and only dierences
in the gender-specic education premia matter for labor supply decisions.  captures the relative
weight on the disutility of work, and  determines the curvature of this disutility. Both parameters
are the same for men and for women.
4.2 Model Inputs
As inputs into the model, we need country-specic information on male hourly wages by education
wi
m(z), female hourly wages by education wi
f(x), non-linear labor income taxes i
l, consumption tax
rates i
c, and the educational composition and matching into couples i(x;z). Last, we calibrate
the two preference parameters in the utility function,  and . When used in the model, wages
and taxes are converted into 2005 US-Dollars, using PPP-adjusted exchange rates obtained from
the Penn World Tables.
4.2.1 Non-Linear Labor Income Taxes and Consumption Taxes
The non-linear labor income tax systems are taken from the \OECD Taxing Wages" modules. The
OECD provides annual household net income based on the respective country's and year's tax
laws, taking income taxes plus employees' social security contributions as well as cash benets into
account. Tax modules are available online from the year 2001 onwards. Using these codes, we can
assign an annual net household income to each combination of male and female annual earnings.
We calculate the exact values for an earnings grid with 101 steps for men, ranging from 0 earnings
to four times the average annual earnings in the country, and for an earnings grid with 201 steps
for women, ranging from 0 earnings to three times the average annual earnings in the country.15
We then linearly interpolate in two dimensions to assign a net annual household income to each
possible annual hours choice of husband and wife. One additional input into the tax codes are the
14Equation (6) is derived as follows. For ease of exposition, assume there would be just one household consisting
of a single member. Total government revenues R are the sum of the revenues from the labor income tax and from
the consumption tax, i.e. R = l + 
i
c(c   T). T is subtracted in this calculation since the transfer is not subject to
the consumption tax. Replacing c from the budget constraint (c =
1
1+i
c (yhh  l)+T), yields R =
1
1+i
c

l + 
i
cyhh

.
The transfer T is then the fraction 
i from government revenues R.
15For women, we thus put in as many steps as the \OECD Taxing Wages" module allows. To give a specic
example, for the US for the year 2005 the dierence between two annual earning levels for men amounts to 2297
US-Dollars and for women to 689 US-Dollars. Note that even though in some countries the top tax bracket applies
to incomes larger than four times the average annual earnings, the wage that we assign to highly educated men and
women never exceeds this threshold even for high hours choices.
14number of children. From the micro data, we calculate the percentage of married couples with 0,
1, 2, 3, or 4+ children conditional on the educational match, and then take the weighted average
over their tax burdens for any pair of hours choices.16
The rst three columns of Table 2 give an overview of the model inputs relating to labor income
taxation. Clearly, it is impossible to summarize the complex non-linear labor income tax systems
in a few numbers. We want to stress that we are exploiting the full non-linearity of the tax code in
our exercise, and here just present some suggestive numbers of the tax code. Columns 1 to 3 show
three possible measures that reect two aspects of the labor income tax schedule: the rst column
(l(0)) shows the country-specic average tax rate evaluated at US mean hours worked of married
men, assuming that the husband is earning the country-specic mean male wage and that the wife
does not work, and thus gives one of many possible measures of an average tax rate. The second
column (0
l(1=2hUS
f )) shows the average (marginal) tax rate paid by the household on the additional
income earned if the woman goes from not working to working half the mean hours of US married
women and earns the country-specic mean female wage, thereby capturing one possible measure
of progressivity.17 The third column then shows the same concept of an average marginal tax rate
if the wife goes from not working to working the average hours of US married women. We use for
both men and women the corresponding US hours to show the average/marginal tax rates faced at
the mean country-specic wages for the same hours choices across all countries.
The US average tax rate as calculated in column 1 amounts to 20.5%, whereas the corresponding
Danish married couple would have to pay an average tax rate of 38.9%, and the Irish couple a tax
rate of only 14.9%. The average tax rates are lowest in the US and Southern Europe, followed by
Eastern and Western Europe, and highest in Scandinavia. The measure of the average (marginal)
tax rate of the secondary income earner shown in column 2 amounts to 29.1% in the US, peaking
at 48.1% in Germany, a country with high progressivity and joint taxation of married couples.
This measure is again on average lowest in Southern Europe, with similar low levels in Eastern
Europe, signicantly higher in Western Europe and the US, and highest in Scandinavia, driven by
Denmark. Column 3 shows that the average marginal tax rate for a married woman who goes from
not working to working the average hours of a US married women exceeds 50 percent in Germany
and Belgium.18
Consumption tax rates for our sample countries are provided by McDaniel (2012), who calculates
consumption tax rates from NIPA data. The advantage of these tax rates over simple value added
tax rates is that they also capture excise taxes, exemptions from the value added tax, etc. They
16We do not have any information on children in Scandinavian countries for our sample period. For these countries,
we calculate the distribution of children from the EU-SILC data. We use the 2004 value for the years 2001 to 2003.
17We dene this average marginal tax rate as 
0
l(1=2h
US
f ) = [l(w
i
mh
US
m ;w
i
f1=2h
US
f )   l(w
i
mh
US
m ;0)]=[w
i
f1=2h
US
f ].
All tax rates in this table are calculated for couples without children. Children decrease l(0) via tax credits etc.,
but hardly aect 
0
l(1=2h
US
f ) and 
0
l(h
US
f ).
18Note that the average marginal tax rates for the US do not change when the female hours are doubled as household
income remains in the same tax bracket.
15Table 2: Model Inputs
Country l(0) 0
l(1=2hUS
f ) 0
l(hUS
f ) c
wf
wm
w
high
m
wlow
m
w
high
f
wlow
f
Czech Republic 21:1 22:0 23:7 14:8 0:76 2:0 1:8
Hungary 26:8 15:6 22:6 23:6 0:82 2:4 2:0
Poland 28:7 30:6 32:4 18:6 0:80 2:3 3:8
Mean 25:5 22:8 26:2 19:0 0:79 2:3 2:5
Denmark 38:9 49:4 48:7 32:0 0:80 1:4 1:3
Norway 28:1 29:8 31:6 24:3 0:78 1:4 1:1
Sweden 32:8 24:8 30:1 32:5 0:76 1:4 1:2
Mean 33:3 34:7 36:8 29:6 0:78 1:4 1:2
Austria 31:0 20:3 28:8 18:7 0:76 1:6 1:7
Belgium 33:5 42:0 50:0 20:7 0:85 1:4 1:6
France 23:6 33:1 33:0 23:8 0:79 1:5 1:7
Ireland 14:9 11:1 23:1 24:0 0:71 1:8 2:6
Germany 31:0 48:1 50:3 15:4 0:73 1:7 1:5
Netherlands 29:5 31:2 38:3 21:3 0:76 1:6 1:5
United Kingdom 25:9 12:1 22:5 17:1 0:74 1:8 2:1
Mean 27:1 28:3 35:1 20:1 0:76 1:6 1:8
Spain 17:4 21:2 20:4 15:9 0:68 1:7 2:6
Greece 24:6 16:0 16:4 14:9 0:71 1:9 2:5
Italy 28:8 25:2 31:4 22:1 0:88 1:8 1:6
Portugal 21:1 22:2 28:5 19:0 0:83 2:9 2:7
Mean 23:0 21:2 24:2 18:0 0:77 2:1 2:3
United States 20:5 29:1 29:1 7:4 0:77 2:1 2:2
Note: l(0) is the country-specic average tax rate evaluated at the average US annual hours worked by married men,
assuming the husband is earning the country-specic mean male wage and the wife does not work. 
0
l(1=2h
US
f ) is the
average marginal tax rate if the woman goes from not working to working half the mean hours of US married women
and earns the country-specic mean female wage, i.e. [l(w
i
mh
US
m ;w
i
f1=2h
US
f )   l(w
i
mh
US
m ;0)]=[w
i
f1=2h
US
f ]. 
0
l(h
US
f )
similarly represents the average marginal tax rate if the woman goes from not working to working the mean hours of
US married women and earns the country-specic mean female wage. All tax rates are calculated for couples without
children. c are consumption tax rates as calculated by McDaniel (2012). wf=wm is the average gender wage gap.
w
high
m =w
low
m is the male education premium (i.e. the wage of high educated men divided by the wage of low educated
men). w
high
f =w
low
f is the same statistic for women. All hourly wages are given in 2005 real, PPP adjusted US Dollars.
16are shown in column 4 of Table 2. Dierences in consumption tax rates are large between the US
and Europe, amounting to more than 10 percentage points, and consumption tax rates are highest
in Scandinavia, where they can exceed 30 percent.
4.2.2 Hourly Wages
To calculate hourly wages, we have to divide earnings by hours. Unfortunately, the ELFS does
not provide earnings data, and the German Microcensus only net data. Therefore, we recur to the
EU Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which is a European household data
set that captures income and hours but features a sample size two orders of magnitude smaller
than the ELFS. We then calculate country- and year-specic mean wages for married men aged
25 to 54 in the EU-SILC and the CPS for three dierent education groups, namely low, medium,
and high education.19 For comparability reasons, we cap hours and earnings in the EU-SILC as in
the CPS, and then construct hourly wages by dividing gross annual individual earnings by annual
hours. We construct annual hours by multiplying usual weekly hours with 52 minus vacation/public
holiday weeks from external data sources. Last, we drop observations with wages less than half
the minimum wage (as in the Review of Economic Dynamics 2010 special issue on cross-country
heterogeneity facts, see Krueger et al. (2010) for details), and the top 1 percent of observations,
which are mostly driven by low hours rather than high earnings and seem to be due to measurement
error. The EU-SILC starts only in 2004, and for some sample countries even later; we extrapolate
wages for the missing years based on Eurostat growth rates of mean wages.
For married women, the issue of self-selection into employment arises. If high ability women of
each education group are more likely to join the labor force, then observed wages overestimate the
distribution of oered wages (see e.g. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)). We therefore apply a simple
two-stage Heckman procedure to impute wages of non-working women. The exclusion restrictions
are that the income of the husband as well as the presence of children do not inuence directly the
wage of a woman.
The last three columns of Table 2 show the corresponding mean gender wage gap in each
country, as well as the education premia (dened as the ratio of wages for high and low educated
people) for men and women. The gender wage gap is quite similar across regions, though with some
dierences across countries. The educational premia tend to be higher for both genders in Eastern
and Southern Europe, as well as the US, than in Western Europe, and are lowest in Scandinavia.
19Low education is dened in EU-SILC, ELFS, and Microcensus as primary and lower secondary education (ISCED
categories 0 to 2), medium education as upper secondary and non-tertiary post-secondary education (ISCED cate-
gories 3 and 4), and high education as any tertiary education (ISCED categories 5 and 6). In the US, low education
is dened by having completed at most 11th grade of high school; medium education by having completed the 12th
grade of high school, having a high school diploma, or attended some college; and high education by having at least
a college degree.
174.2.3 Educational Composition and Matching into Couples
We take the percentage of husbands and wives per education group, as well as their matching into
couples, directly from the data.20 We then assign to each individual the gender-specic mean wage
by education that we estimated from the EU-SILC and CPS. The demographic composition is shown
in Appendix Table A.6. The rst four columns show the percentage of men and women with low or
high education, respectively, omitting the group of medium education, and the last column shows a
simple correlation coecient of the matching into couples between the three education groups. The
degree of assortative matching is relatively homogeneous across countries, with assortative matching
being naturally more prevalent in countries in which a large share of the population has the same
educational level. However, there are substantial dierences in the educational composition: in
Southern Europe, more than half of the population exhibit low education, while in Eastern Europe
and the US only around 10 percent do. Higher education rates are largest in the US with around
45 percent, followed by Scandinavia and Western Europe, and smallest in Eastern and Southern
Europe with between 15 and 20 percent.
4.2.4 Redistribution of Government Revenues
The government redistributes a fraction i 2 [0;1] of all government revenues back to the households
in a lump-sum fashion. In the benchmark calibration, we follow Rogerson (2008), Ohanian et al.
(2008), and Ragan (2013) and assume full redistribution of government revenues and thus set i = 1.
In Section 8.2, we show results from two alternative specications with either no redistribution of
government revenues (i.e setting i = 0), or from setting i equal to 1 minus twice the share of
expenditures on military from all government expenditures, similar to the specication used by
Prescott (2004).
4.2.5 Calibration of Preference Parameters
As Kaygusuz (2010), we set the labor supply elasticity  = 0:5, which is consistent with the
estimates surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Domeij and Flod en (2006), and Keane (2011).
The weight on the disutility of work () is calibrated to match average hours worked per person by
men (recall that we do not model an explicit intensive margin for them) and female hours worked
per employed woman, and takes the value of  = 0:457.
Again following Kaygusuz (2010), Guner et al. (2012a) and Guner et al. (2012b), the utility
cost parameter is distributed according to a exible gamma distribution, with the shape parameter
20For the Scandinavian countries we do not have any information on spousal education. We therefore base the
matching into couples on data from EU-SILC applying the same sample selection criteria.
18Table 3: Model Match { Some Statistics for Married Women
Data Model Dierence
Employment Rate
Low education 44:9 46:8 1:9
Medium education 69:4 66:6  2:8
High education 76:5 78:1 1:6
Mean 70:7 70:3 -0:5
Hours Worked per Employed
Low education 1682:9 1524:9  9:4
Medium education 1739:8 1649:0  5:2
High education 1757:6 1768:2 0:6
Mean 1746:3 1693:9 -3:0
 Percentage point dierence for employment rate, percentage dierence for hours
worked per employed.
kz and scale parameter z being conditional on the husband's type:
q  (qjz)  qkz 1exp( q=z)
 (kz)kz
z
; (7)
where  () is the Gamma function. For each husband's education level z, we select the parameters
kz and z to match as closely as possible the female labor force participation rates by their wives'
three own education levels x 2 flow;medium;highg.
For given preference parameters  and , and conditional on being married to a type z husband,
the three dierent education levels x and implied wages generate three dierent threshold levels
 q(x;z) at which a woman of type x is indierent between working and not working. Assume for
simplicity that all type z husbands work the same amount of hours. Women with more education,
i.e. a higher wage, will have a higher threshold q, and therefore a higher labor force participation
rate for any given distribution of q. This pattern is also prevalent in the data, i.e. conditional on
the husband's education, the female labor force participation rate is increasing in the woman's own
education. The parameters kz and z are then selected to ensure that the mass of women below
these thresholds corresponds to the empirically observed participation rates of the women's labor
force participation by their own education conditional on the husband's education.
Table 3 shows how the model matches the extensive and the intensive margins for married
women by education group. Note that none of these education-specic statistics are explicitly
19targeted by the model, but only the average hours worked across education groups and gender.21
The model captures the gradient in the employment rate and hours worked per employed by
education very well. Along the intensive margin, the model slightly underestimates hours worked
per employed married woman. Similarly, not shown here, it overestimates hours worked per married
man by 3 percent. In not reported results, we calibrate gender-specic disutility weights from
working, which allow us to match gender-specic hours worked perfectly. This has almost no eect
on the cross-country predictions. Along the intensive margin, the model also slightly overestimates
the variability by education, predicting lower hours than in the data for the low education group,
but higher hours for the high education group.
Note that we keep all preference parameters constant when analyzing the cross-country predic-
tions of the model. This might be especially far-fetched for the disutility of joint work q, which
could among other things capture factors that likely vary internationally, e.g. child care costs and
availability, regulations regarding part-time work, etc. Thus, our exercise will tell us how much of
the cross-country variation in hours worked we can explain with taxes and wages, abstracting from
these other factors. This is in the spirit of other quantitative economics papers that focus on the
eects of single factors without building an all-encompassing model.
4.3 Time-Series Performance of the Model
While the goal of the paper is to use the model to evaluate in how far dierences in taxes and wages
can explain cross-country dierences in hours worked of married women and men, we can evaluate
the predictive power of the model also by analyzing its performance in replicating the US time series
of labor supply of married couples. To do that, we generate the US-specic model inputs back to
the year 1979 and plug them into the model, keeping the preference parameter values xed.22 As
later on in the cross-country comparisons, we take the actual matching of men and women of the
three education groups into couples from the data and replicate it in the model. Figure 3 shows
employment rate dierences (in percentage points, left y-axis) and hours dierences (in levels,
right y-axis) for each year relative to the year 2008 in the data and the model. The model correctly
predicts hardly any change in hours worked of married men over the period of three decades. While
hours worked per married man where 50 hours higher in 1979 than in 2008, the model predicts a
dierence of 75 hours. For married women, the model captures both the increase in the employment
rate and in hours worked per employed very well. The employment rate increases in both model
and data by 15 percentage points from 1979 to 2008, with some deviations in the 1990s, when the
model predicts an increase in the late 90s rather than in the early 90s. Especially the increase in
21Table A.7 in the appendix records the t of female employment rates by education of the husband and education
of the wife. The average female employment rates by education of the husband, which are explicit targets, are
matched almost perfectly.
22For the labor income taxes in the US, we can use the \NBER TaxSim" module, which in contrast to the \OECD
Taxing Wages" modules goes back to the 70s. As in the OECD modules, the state tax is taken from Michigan, which
is close to the average across the US states, and the city tax is taken from Detroit.
20Figure 3: Time-Series Predictions for the US
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the 1980s, when several tax reforms favored married women (see also Kaygusuz (2010)), is captured
correctly by the model. The dierence in hours worked per employed is overstated by around 50
hours around 1980, but the increase over the remaining years is replicated almost perfectly.
To understand which input factor is responsible for the success of the model in replicating the
rise in female employment rates and hours worked per employed in the US, we also let only the labor
income taxes, only wages, or only the educational composition plus matching into couples vary over
time, while holding everything else constant.23 Labor income taxes and wages both separately can
account for around one third of the rise in the female employment rate, and one half of the rise in
female hours worked per employed. For the employment rate, the remaining third of the increase
is explained by changes in the educational composition and matching into couples. Thus, changes
in the tax code over time are as important as changes in the gender and educational wage gaps in
explaining the rise in both the intensive and extensive margins of female labor supply in the US
from the late 1970s to the late 2000s. Non-linearities between the dierent factors are relatively
weak.
23Consumption taxes are almost constant over the time period in question anyway.
215 Results
Keeping the preference parameters xed across countries, we use country-specic taxes, wages,
and the demographic composition (i.e. the educational distribution by gender and the degree of
assortative matching) in order to obtain predicted hours worked of married couples across countries.
We rst present the cross-sectional predictions of hours worked per person of married men and
women, before we decompose hours worked of married women further into an extensive and an
intensive margin. Using the US as the benchmark country, we always compare deviations from
US hours in model and data. In a decomposition analysis, we evaluate the relative importance of
wages and taxes in explaining the cross-country variations of married individuals' hours worked.
We further analyze the eects of labor income taxes by decomposing them into dierences in tax
levels and dierences in marginal tax rate schedules. We discuss Denmark and Portugal separately
in the last subsection: Denmark is an important outlier within Scandinavia in terms of the taxes,
while Portugal is an outlier within Southern Europe in terms of the data.
5.1 Hours Worked per Person in Model and Data
Table 4 shows in the rst column the percent dierence in married men's hours worked per person
between the respective country and the US in the data, and in the second column the model
predicted percent dierence. Similarly, the third and fourth columns show percent dierences to
the US in data and model for married women.
Dierences in taxation, wages, and the demographic composition explain the cross-country
variation in married men's hours worked very well. On average, the model somewhat underpredicts
the dierences to the US. While married men in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia work 11 and 17
percent less, respectively, than married men in the US in the data, the model predicts on average a
dierence of minus 6 and minus 11 percent, respectively. For Western Europe, the t is best with a
model predicted dierence of 8 percent, compared to 10 percent in the data. For Southern Europe,
the model explain half of the dierence to the US. However, this is almost entirely driven by the
bad t for Spain, which exhibits 12 percent lower male hours worked than the US, while the model
predicts 2 percent higher hours than in the US. Focusing on individual countries, for 9 countries
the dierences between prediction and data amount to 3 percentage points or less. Overall, the
correlation between male hours worked per person in data and model amounts to 0.44.
We now turn to hours worked of married women in the last two columns of Table 4. Eastern
European married women work on average 3 percent less than US ones in the data, which the
model replicates very closely with a prediction of minus 5 percent. For Scandinavia, the model
generates a similarly good t with a dierence to the US of minus 9 percent in the data, compared
to minus 6 percent in the model. Thus, the model is able to replicate the small dierences to the
US in married women's hours worked for both Eastern Europe and Scandinavia.
22Table 4: Male and Female Hours Worked per Person { Percent Dierences Relative to the US
Men Women
Country Data Model Data Model
Czech Republic  0:04  0:01 0:02  0:01
Hungary  0:16  0:11  0:04  0:01
Poland  0:14  0:04  0:05  0:13
Mean -0:11 -0:06 -0:03 -0:05
Norway  0:18  0:10  0:13  0:05
Sweden  0:16  0:13  0:04  0:08
Mean -0:17 -0:11 -0:09 -0:06
Austria  0:07  0:09  0:22  0:06
Belgium  0:13  0:14  0:20  0:29
France  0:16  0:02  0:16  0:13
Germany  0:14  0:08  0:34  0:29
Ireland  0:05  0:05  0:34  0:19
Netherlands  0:10  0:10  0:38  0:14
United Kingdom  0:07  0:04  0:19  0:11
Mean -0:10 -0:08 -0:26 -0:17
Greece  0:02  0:04  0:21  0:07
Italy  0:14  0:11  0:39  0:10
Spain  0:12 0:02  0:33  0:19
Mean -0:09 -0:04 -0:31 -0:12
For Western Europe the model explains two thirds of the observed large dierence in married
women's hours worked of minus 26 percent in the data. The t is very good for France and
Germany, with a deviation between model and data of only 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively.
This excellent t is quite remarkable, given that married women work 16 percent (200 hours)
and 34 percent (425 hours) less, respectively, in these two countries than in the US. Only for the
Netherlands and Austria, where married women work 38 percent and 22 percent, respectively, less
than in the US, can the model explain less than half of the dierence. For Belgium, the model
overshoots in predicting the dierence.
For Southern Europe, the model explains on average 40 percent of the dierence in hours worked
relative to the US, predicting 12 percent lower hours than in the US, while in the data Southern
23European married women work 31 percent less than their US counterparts. Relative to the other
regions, additional factors outside the model, e.g. cultural eects, must play a more important
role in Southern Europe (see e.g. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) for evidence on strong family ties in
Southern Europe lowering female labor market participation rates).
Summarizing, the model replicates very successfully the small dierence in married women's
hours worked between Eastern Europe and Scandinavia and the US, and explains on average two
thirds and 40 percent of the large dierences in hours worked per married woman between the US
and Western and Southern Europe. The correlation between married women's hours worked per
person in model and data amounts to 0.56 and is thus higher than for men. Also, the model is able
to replicate the low correlation of male and female hours worked per person in the data: while the
correlation is slightly negative with -.12 in the data, it is slightly positive with .06 in the model.24
5.2 Extensive and Intensive Margins of Married Women's Hours Worked
For married women, we further compare the performance of the model in explaining extensive and
intensive margin dierences relative to the US. Table 5 shows the corresponding results. The rst
two columns show employment rate dierences relative to the US (in percentage points) in the data
and the model, respectively, the next two columns show hours worked per employed dierences (in
percent).
The model generates a close t on both margins for Eastern Europe. For Southern Europe, the
model reproduces half of the employment rate dierence, but underestimates the dierence in the
intensive margin with 1 percent relative to 12 percent in the data.
However, the decomposition into the extensive and intensive margin does not work well for
Scandinavia and Western Europe. Scandinavia and Western Europe exhibit higher employment
rates of married women than the US, namely 13 percentage points and 1 percentage point higher
ones, respectively. By contrast, the model predicts lower employment rates by 2 and 7 percentage
points, respectively. Regarding hours worked per employed, the opposite picture arises, with large
negative dierences in the data, namely 23 percent for Scandinavia and 27 percent for Western Eu-
rope, but smaller predicted negative dierences by the model, namely 3 and 8 percent, respectively.
For Scandinavia and Western Europe, the model thus has diculties explaining the decomposition
of hours worked per married woman into an intensive and an extensive margin. It does however an
overall decent job in establishing the relative ordering of countries in hours worked per employed and
employment rate dierences relative to the US: the correlations between model and data amount
to 0.44 and 0.33, respectively. Similarly, the model captures the cross-country correlations between
male and female labor supply. It not only replicates the almost zero correlation between male and
female hours worked per person fairly well (as already reported in the previous subsection), but
also the negative correlation between male hours worked per person and female employment rates
24The correlation in the data is -.12 if Denmark and Portugal are excluded, and .05 if they are included.
24Table 5: Female Employment Rate (ER) and Female Hours Worked per Employed (HWE) Dier-
ences Relative to the US
ER HWE
Country Data Model Data Model
Czech Republic 0:03  0:02  0:02 0:01
Hungary  0:04 0:03 0:02  0:06
Poland  0:04  0:07 0:01  0:04
Mean -0:02 -0:02 0:00 -0:03
Norway 0:12  0:01  0:26  0:03
Sweden 0:14  0:03  0:20  0:04
Mean 0:13 -0:02 -0:23 -0:03
Austria 0:03 0:00  0:25  0:07
Belgium 0:00  0:12  0:20  0:14
France 0:03  0:08  0:20  0:02
Germany 0:01  0:14  0:35  0:12
Ireland  0:09  0:08  0:25  0:08
Netherlands 0:04  0:07  0:41  0:04
United Kingdom 0:06  0:04  0:26  0:06
Mean 0:01 -0:07 -0:27 -0:08
Greece  0:14  0:05 0:00 0:00
Italy  0:16  0:06  0:22  0:01
Spain  0:16  0:13  0:13  0:01
Mean -0:15 -0:08 -0:12 -0:01
Note: For the employment rate we show percentage point dierences, and for hours
worked per employed percent dierences.
(-.30 in the data and -.20 in the model), and at least qualitatively generates the positive correlation
between male hours worked per person and female hours worked per employed (.13 in the data vs.
.51 in the model).
Through the lens of the model, it is not surprising that we have diculties explaining the vastly
dierent decomposition into intensive and extensive margins in Scandinavia and Western Europe
on the one hand, and Eastern and Southern Europe and the US on the other hand shown in Figure
2. Since the eects of taxes and wages should aect both margins in the same direction (which
we will conrm in the next subsection when looking at the dierent model inputs separately), the
predictions relative to the US are qualitatively similar across both margins. As a consequence,
25the model features a positive correlation of .37 between married women's employment rates and
hours worked per employed, while in the data the correlation is -.37. One reason for the negative
correlation in the data not captured by our model might be that the marginal woman entering the
labor market exhibits low labor productivity, and therefore optimally chooses to work few hours.
The heterogeneity in productivity in our model is quite limited, being restricted to three education
levels. Thus, the heterogeneity of xed costs of joint work plays a much larger role in determining
the marginal woman entering employment than her own labor productivity. She will thus work just
as many hours as her counterparts already in the labor market.
As a key open question remains what makes Scandinavia and Western Europe dierent from
the US, Eastern and Southern Europe, and could help explaining the patterns observed in the
data. One explanation could be dierent returns to experience or depreciation of human capital,
which in Western Europe and Scandinavia would have to be driven rather by the extensive margin,
and in the US by the intensive margin (in relative terms). Secondly, the availability of part-time
jobs could dier across countries. In Bick et al. (2014), we present some evidence suggesting that
there indeed exists a scarcity of part-time jobs relative to their demand in the US, Eastern and
Southern Europe, compared to Western Europe and Scandinavia. A reduced form way to model
both these features in our static framework would be to make wages depend on hours worked,
either in a discrete or continuous way. If relative to the US wages oered at lower hours worked are
higher in Western Europe and Scandinavia (i.e. the part-time penalty is lower in Western Europe
and Scandinavia than in the US), more women are above the threshold level to participate  q in
these two regions. Moreover, these women would optimally choose to work lower hours than the
average working US woman, for whom due to the part-time penalty working is only benecial if
she chooses to work long hours. Alternatively, the scarcity of part-time jobs could be captured by
a dierent distribution of the disutility of working q leading to higher employment rates in Western
Europe and Scandinavia, which would however have hardly any impact on the intensive margin.
Finally, one could follow the argument put forward in Ragan (2013) and Ngai and Pissarides (2011),
namely to model government subsidies in Western Europe and Scandinavia in sectors that serve as
complements to home production (e.g. child care). In contrast to their modeling approach, it would
however be key that the subsidies are paid conditional on working, rather than (linearly) increasing
in hours worked. All these explanations are hard to quantify and therefore not incorporated into
the model, but may indicate avenues for future research.
5.3 Decomposition Analysis
To understand the relative importance of wages and taxes in explaining the cross-country dier-
ences, we simulate the model setting only one feature of the economic environment country-specic
and leaving all others as in the US. For each exercise we adjust the transfers such that the govern-
ment always maintains a balanced budget. Results from this decomposition analysis are shown in
26Table 6. We present the results here only for the country groups; detailed country results are shown
in Appendix tables A.8 to A.11. Columns \Data" and \Model" in Table 6 replicate the results
from Tables 4 and 5, in which we use the full country-specic economic environment described in
Equations (1) to (6). The next three columns set only one single element in Equations (1) to (6)
specic to country i, namely non-linear labor income taxes (l), consumption taxes (c), or wages
(w), while keeping all others at the US level.
The rst column (l) shows the results if the tax system is set country-specic, while gross
household income yhh in Equation (4) remains at the US level, i.e.
yhh = wUS
m (z)hm + wUS
f (x)hf: (8)
Progressive tax systems are in some way dened relative to the income level in a country. For
example, the US mean wage (  wUS) is around four times higher than the mean wage in Hungary
(which has the lowest wage). Simply applying the Hungarian tax system one to one to the US would
imply that the average household would end up in a range of the tax code featuring a much higher
tax rate than the average Hungarian household. We account for this in the following way. First,
we calculate for any combination of male and female hours choices the country-specic tax rate
using the US gender-specic education premia and the country-specic mean wage (  wi) . Second,
we apply the resulting average tax rate to the corresponding US household income to obtain the
household's income tax liability l, and set Equation (5) equal to:
l = yhh
i
l

wUS
m (z)
 wUS  wihm;
wUS
f (x)
 wUS  wihf

wUS
m (z)
 wUS  wihm +
wUS
f (x)
 wUS  wihf
(9)
in the household optimization problem.
We proceed in a similar fashion when we analyze the eects of country-specic gender-education
premia. Household income in Equation (4) in this case is replaced by
yhh =
wi
m(z)
 wi  wUShm +
wi
f(x)
 wi  wUShf; (10)
and the household's income tax liability in Equation (5) by
l = US
l
 
wi
m(z)
 wi  wUShm;
wi
f(x)
 wi  wUShf
!
: (11)
Thus, the mean wage remains unchanged, but only the gender-education premia are set country-
specic.
The last column shows the predicted dierences to the US if labor income taxes, consumption
27taxes, and wages are jointly set country-specic; what then still remains at the US level is the
heterogeneity in education and the matching by male and female education levels into couples.
The table exhibits four panels, each comprising the four European regions. The two upper panels
show dierences to the US in male and female hours worked per person, respectively, while the
two lower panels decompose female hours worked per person into the extensive and the intensive
margin.
Among the dierent features of the country-specic environments, labor income taxes play
the largest role in explaining low hours worked relative to the US for men, whereas for women
consumption taxes are the main factor driving European female hours worked down (see two upper
panels). While labor income taxes uniformly predict lower hours worked of married men in Europe
than in the US by 3 to 7 percent, they in fact predict lower hours worked for married women than
in the US only for Western Europe, but higher ones for Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and Southern
Europe. Only for Western Europe is the eect of labor income taxes of roughly the same size as the
eect of consumption taxes.25 One can already see here that for Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and
Southern Europe, labor income taxes partly counterweigh the eect of consumption taxes, which
explains the success of the model in replicating married women's hours worked in Eastern Europe
and Scandinavia, and its diculties in replicating married women's hours worked in Southern
Europe. We will analyze the reason for this counterweighing eect in the next Subsection 5.4,
which investigates the labor income taxes in more detail.
Not surprisingly, the disincentive eects of consumption taxes on hours worked of both married
men and women are largest for Scandinavia, where consumption taxes are highest. Consumption
taxes alone would predict that Scandinavian married women should work 12 percent less than US
married women. For all other European regions, the eects of consumption taxes alone on married
women's labor supply are also sizeable, predicting around 7 percent lower hours worked than in
the US. For married men, the disincentive eects of European consumption taxes are smaller, with
2 to 5 percent. This is due to the higher implied female elasticity of labor supply, which arises
because women face lower wages and are aected both along the extensive and intensive margin.26
As expected, the regional ordering of the consumption tax eect is the same for men and women
(for both, the eects are largest for Scandinavia and smallest for Southern Europe), while this is
not at all true for labor income taxes.
The eect of the country-specic gender and educational wage premia on hours worked in
Europe is relatively small. It is largest for Scandinavian married women: wages alone in fact
predict 3 percent higher hours worked than in the US, in contrast to lower hours worked in the
data. For Southern Europe, in turn, wages alone predict 3 percent lower hours worked than in the
25Note that the previous literature on taxation and hours worked, e.g. Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), and
McDaniel (2011), do not distinguish the eects of labor and consumption taxes in a decomposition exercise.
26Note that, even if we would model an extensive margin for men, due to their already very high participation
rates we would expect only minimal eects along this margin.
28T
a
b
l
e
6
:
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
E

e
c
t
s
o
f
D
i

e
r
e
n
t
M
o
d
e
l
I
n
p
u
t
s
o
n
L
a
b
o
r
S
u
p
p
l
y
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
S
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
G
r
o
u
p
D
a
t
a
M
o
d
e
l

l

c
w

l
+

c
+
w
H
W
P
m
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
1
1
 
0
:
0
6
 
0
:
0
4
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
7
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
 
0
:
1
7
 
0
:
1
1
 
0
:
0
7
 
0
:
0
5
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
1
2
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
1
0
 
0
:
0
8
 
0
:
0
6
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
9
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
0
9
 
0
:
0
4
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
6
H
W
P
f
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
5
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
7
0
:
0
0
 
0
:
0
6
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
 
0
:
0
9
 
0
:
0
6
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
1
2
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
6
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
2
6
 
0
:
1
7
 
0
:
0
6
 
0
:
0
8
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
1
1
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
3
1
 
0
:
1
2
0
:
0
7
 
0
:
0
6
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
1
E
R
f
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
2
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
3
0
:
0
0
 
0
:
0
1
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
0
:
1
3
 
0
:
0
2
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
5
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
2
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
7
 
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
3
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
3
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
1
5
 
0
:
0
8
0
:
0
4
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
1
0
:
0
1
H
W
E
f
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
0
:
0
0
 
0
:
0
3
0
:
0
0
 
0
:
0
3
0
:
0
0
 
0
:
0
4
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
 
0
:
2
3
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
5
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
4
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
2
7
 
0
:
0
8
 
0
:
0
6
 
0
:
0
3
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
7
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
0
:
1
2
 
0
:
0
1
0
:
0
1
 
0
:
0
3
 
0
:
0
2
 
0
:
0
2
N
o
t
e
:
F
o
r
t
h
e
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
4
t
o
6
,
e
x
a
c
t
l
y
o
n
e
m
o
d
e
l
i
n
p
u
t
i
s
s
e
t
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
r
e
s
t
a
r
e
l
e
f
t
u
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
i
r
U
S
v
a
l
u
e
s
.
F
o
r
t
h
e
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
7
,
t
h
r
e
e
m
o
d
e
l
i
n
p
u
t
s
a
r
e
s
e
t
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
,
a
n
d
o
n
l
y
t
h
e
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
m
a
t
c
h
i
n
g
a
r
e
l
e
f
t
u
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
i
r
U
S
v
a
l
u
e
s
.
T
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
a
r
e
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
T
a
b
l
e
s
A
.
8
t
o
A
.
1
1
i
n
t
h
e
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
.
29US. Southern Europe is the only region where the wage eect goes in the same direction as the
data, namely predicting lower hours worked in Europe than in the US. As Table 2 shows, in fact
the gender wage gap is somewhat smaller on average in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe than in
the US, and very similar in Southern and Western Europe.
Column 5 shows the joint eect of taxation and wages, setting labor income and consumption
taxes as well as wages country-specic. The joint eect is quite similar to the sum of the three
individual eects, pointing to small interaction eects. Compared to the full model predictions, the
educational composition and the matching into couples are still at the US level here. Comparing
the results with the full model predictions, one can see that for Western and Southern European
women the demographic composition is a further factor in explaining lower hours worked in Europe
than in the US. This is especially true for Southern Europe, where the percentage of low-educated
women is much larger than in the US.
The two lower panels of Table 6 further decompose hours worked per person of married women
into the extensive and the intensive margin. In Section 5.2, we saw that the model predictions
are qualitatively similar across the extensive and the intensive margin. Here, one can see that
this is also true for the individual features of the country-specic economic environment. For the
consumption tax and wages, the results are quantitatively almost the same across both margins.
For labor income taxes, the ordering across country groups is also preserved: Western European
labor income taxes generate the lowest employment rate and lowest hours worked per employed
woman, and Southern European labor income taxes the highest employment rate and highest hours
worked per employed woman.
Summarizing, the decomposition analysis shows that labor income taxes are of great importance
in explaining the lower hours worked of married men in Europe than in the US, while consumption
taxes are the main driver of low hours worked of married women in Europe. The eect of wage
dierences on hours worked dierences is relatively small for both men and women.
5.4 Investigating Labor Income Taxes in More Detail
One can conceptually distinguish two components of the labor income tax code which dier in-
ternationally: rst, the average tax rate, i.e. the level of the tax schedule, and second, the actual
marginal tax schedule along with the tax treatment of married couples, which together dene how
the marginal tax rate for each spouse changes with the own and the spousal income. In the previous
subsection, we saw that labor income taxes uniformly predict lower hours worked in Europe than
in the US for married men, but for married women only in Western Europe. In this subsection, we
derive more insights into why this is the case by further decomposing the actual non-linear labor
income tax schedule into the average tax rate and the tax structure, i.e. the non-linearity of the tax
system along with the tax treatment of married couples. To distinguish between the average tax
rate and the tax structure, we conduct the following experiment: to capture the eect of the tax
30Table 7: The Eect of the Tax Structure and Tax Level on Labor Supply Relative to the US
Country Group Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
HWPm Eastern Europe  0:11  0:04  0:05 0:01
Scandinavia  0:17  0:07  0:04  0:03
Western Europe  0:10  0:06  0:04  0:02
Southern Europe  0:09  0:03  0:03 0:00
HWPf Eastern Europe  0:03 0:03 0:02 0:01
Scandinavia  0:09 0:01 0:08  0:07
Western Europe  0:26  0:06  0:02  0:04
Southern Europe  0:31 0:07 0:07 0:00
ERf Eastern Europe  0:02 0:02 0:01 0:01
Scandinavia 0:13 0:02 0:05  0:03
Western Europe 0:01  0:01 0:01  0:02
Southern Europe  0:15 0:04 0:04 0:00
HWEf Eastern Europe 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01
Scandinavia  0:23  0:02 0:00  0:03
Western Europe  0:27  0:06  0:03  0:02
Southern Europe  0:12 0:01 0:01 0:00
Note: Columns 4 and 5 add up to Column 3. Column 3 corresponds to column 4 in Table 6. The
country-specic results are shown in Tables A.13 to A.16 in the Appendix.
structure alone, we calculate the taxes implied by the country-specic tax code as in Equation (9),
but then levy an additional linear tax or subsidy such that government revenues are left unchanged
at the US level.27 Put dierently, one may think of this experiment as a reform which implements
a dierent tax structure but is required to be revenue neutral. The eect of the country-specic
average tax rate, or the level, is then indirectly inferred by the dierence in hours worked between
setting the entire labor income tax schedule country specic, or shifting it up or down to match
the US government revenues.28
Table 7 shows the resulting decomposition of the labor income tax eect into the tax structure
and the average tax rate (the full country results are shown in Appendix Tables A.13 to A.16). As
in the previous table, the upper panel shows results for hours worked per person of married men.
27The household's income tax liability (Equation 5) hence becomes l = 
i
l(w
i
m(z)hm;w
i
f(x)hf;k
i) + 
iyhh, with

i > 0 being an additional linear tax and 
i < 0 being a subsidy.
28As an alternative to adding a linear tax in order to shift the average tax rate, we follow Guvenen et al. (2014),
who require that for any gross income level z the following condition has to be satised:
1 ~ 0
l(z)
1 0
l(z) = (1   )8z, where

0
l is the marginal tax rate of the original tax schedule, ~ 
0
l is the marginal tax rate of the schedule allowing for a
dierent average tax rate, and  is a constant. Results using this approach are quantitatively similar and are shown
in the Appendix in Table A.12.
31For this group, the tax structure uniformly predicts lower hours worked in Europe than in the US,
while the average tax rate has a smaller eect, and even a positive one in Eastern Europe. This
indicates the higher progressivity of taxes in Europe. The mechanism is reinforced since the degree
of joint taxation is more pronounced in the US than in most other countries. Therefore American
married men actually face a lower marginal tax rate. On top of that is an additional disincentive
eect through the higher tax levels in Scandinavia and Western Europe.
For married women, the results are very dierent, with the tax structure on average predicting
higher hours worked in Europe than in the US, rather than lower hours worked. Focusing rst on
the tax level, we see that, as for consumption taxes, the relative ordering of the regional eects
is the same for men and women, with larger eects for women due to the higher implied female
elasticity. The tax level predicts 7 and 4 percent lower hours worked by married women in Scan-
dinavia and Western Europe, respectively, with almost no eect for Southern and Eastern Europe.
This ordering is in line with the measure of the average tax rate shown in Table 2, which was
highest in Scandinavia, followed by Western Europe, then Eastern and Southern Europe. Thus,
the disincentive eects of average labor income tax rates and of consumption taxes are quite easy
to deduce from the data, and always larger for women than for men.
By contrast, the tax structure itself predicts uniformly higher hours worked of married women
in Europe than in the US, with the exception of Western Europe. For Western Europe, the tax
structure alone would predict 2 percent lower hours worked per married woman than in the US,
for Eastern Europe 2 percent higher hours, and for Southern Europe and Scandinavia 7 and 8
percent higher hours. In fact, as Table A.14 in the appendix shows, there are only four countries
for which the tax structure alone would predict lower hours worked of married women in Europe
than in the US, namely Germany, Ireland, and Belgium, all located in Western Europe, plus the
Czech Republic. In Scandinavia the two large eects of the average tax rate and the tax structure
nearly oset each other. In Eastern Europe, both eects are positive and add up, while for Western
Europe both are negative and add up. For Southern Europe, all eects come from the tax structure
and would predict higher hours worked than in the US.
The reason behind this positive eect of the tax structure on married women's hours worked in
Europe compared to the US lies in the joint taxation of married couples in the US. Joint taxation
makes the marginal tax rate of the each spouse depend on the other spouse's income. E.g. in
Germany, which has a relatively pure system of joint taxation, half of the couple's joint income is
assigned to each partner when determining his or her taxes. As a result, if a woman starts working,
she faces a relatively high marginal tax rate, which is increasing in her husband's income. Table 2
presented as an exemplary measure the average marginal tax rate if a woman starts working the
same hours as the average US woman. This rate exceeds 50% in Germany, but is only close to 30%
in the US, reecting the higher progessivity of the general labor income tax schedule in Germany
even though both countries feature joint taxation. This in fact explains the larger disincentive
32eect of the tax schedule on married women's hours worked in Germany than in the US predicted
by the model. In contrast, most of the other European countries feature systems closer to separate
taxation than the US system. Therefore, the tax structure predicts higher hours worked of married
women for the majority of European countries. Section 6 shows explicitly the degree of jointness of
taxation in each country by comparing predicted labor supply under the current income taxation
system and a system of strictly separate taxation.
Thus, the decomposition of the labor income tax into the tax schedule and the average tax
rate makes it clear that the average tax rate alone is not a good approximation of the incentive
eects of income taxes on married women's labor supply, as will be discussed further in Section 7.
Especially to generate the comparatively high hours worked of married women in Eastern Europe
and Scandinavia, incorporating the tax structure is crucial. For Southern Europe, by contrast, the
tax structure would predict higher hours worked than in the US, and thus makes it more dicult to
predict hours worked dierences in the data. Therefore, additional eects outside the model which
reduce hours worked in Southern Europe must be large. Comparing the extensive and the intensive
margin, the tax structure itself matters more on the extensive margin, and predicts between 1 and
5 percentage points higher employment rates in Europe than in the US.
5.5 Two Outliers: Denmark and Portugal
As discussed in the introduction, there are two outliers that we shortly discuss separately in this sec-
tion, namely Denmark within Scandinavia and Portugal within Southern Europe. Danish married
women work essentially the same number of hours as US married women, but the model predicts
a dierence of minus 26 percent (see Table 8). The failure of the model to replicate the labor
supply behavior of Danish married women comes from the joint eect of consumption and labor
income taxes. In contrast to the other Scandinavian countries, the labor income tax also predicts
substantially lower hours in Denmark than in the US: Denmark features the highest average tax
rate in Scandinavia and combines this with a tax system that features strong elements of joint
taxation, which is not the case in the other Scandinavian countries. While the tax structure still
predicts higher hours worked in Denmark than in the US, the eect is relatively weak compared
to the other Scandinavian countries. Coupled with the much stronger negative eect of the high
average tax rate, this leads to a predicted dierence of minus 17 percent based on the income taxes
alone.
Portugal, on the other hand, is a clear outlier when it comes to Southern Europe from the
data side. While Greek, Spanish, and Italian married women work between 20 and 40 percent
fewer hours than US married women, Portuguese married women work even slightly more hours
than US ones. While the Portuguese labor income tax system alone correctly predicts higher hours
worked in Portugal than in the US, consumption taxes, wages, and the demographic composition
all predict lower hours worked, such that in the end the model predicts 18 percent lower hours
33Table 8: Decomposing Hours Worked Dierences Relative to the US for Denmark and Portugal
Tax
Country Data Model c l w Structure Level
HWPm Denmark  0:13  0:16  0:05  0:12 0:00  0:03  0:08
Portugal  0:10  0:03  0:03  0:01  0:02  0:02 0:01
HWPf Denmark  0:01  0:26  0:14  0:17 0:06 0:02  0:19
Portugal 0:03  0:18  0:07 0:04  0:11 0:02 0:02
worked of married women in Portugal than in the US. Note, however, that the tax structure eect
goes into the correct direction for both countries, closing the gap between model and data.
6 Joint vs. Separate Taxation
In this section, we get further insights into the degree of individual vs. joint taxation in the sample
countries, and the potential disincentive eects of the current systems of (joint) taxation on married
women's labor supply. In order to do so, we compare two singles living together in one household
with a married couple living in one household. We analyze the case of no children to avoid further
complications, e.g. as who of the two spouses would receive a potential child tax credit or benet.
Both households share the same utility function, but have dierent budget constraints, since the
members of the rst household are taxed as singles, while the members of the second household are
taxed as in the actual tax code, thus capturing any elements of joint taxation. For the household
with two singles, the budget constraint becomes
c =
1
(1 + c)
[(1   )wm(z)hm   l(wm(z)hm) + (1   )wf(x)hf   l(wf(x)hf)] + T: (12)
We add a proportional tax/subsidy rate  as in Section 5.4 when going from the current system to
a system of strictly separate taxation, such that tax revenues are kept constant in both cases. In
countries with joint taxation, going from the current system to one of separate taxation lowers the
marginal tax rates of married women, but increases the ones of married men.
Figure 4 shows the eect of going from the current system to one of strictly separate taxation
of married couples on hours worked per person of married women (dark bars) and married men
(light bars). For six of the 18 countries, female labor supply increases by less than 50 hours. For
Sweden, Hungary, Greece, and the UK, eects are virtually zero, indicating that these countries
exhibit strict systems of individual taxation.29 For a further 5 countries, female hours worked
29The caveat applies that this is at least true for the nine couple types that we consider, but might not be entirely
34Figure 4: Hours Worked Per Person (HWP) under the Current System and a System of Strictly
Separate Filing
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Note: This gure shows the predicted changes in hours worked per person when going from the current country-
specic system of ling to a system of strictly separate taxation of married couples, keeping government
revenues constant.
increase by 50 to 100 hours. The remaining 7 countries show signicant eects on female labor
supply: in France, Portugal, the US, and Ireland, female hours worked would increase by 100 to
150 hours, in Denmark by 180 hours, in Belgium by 250 hours, and in Germany by even 300 hours.
These are very large eects, as 300 hours correspond to almost two months of full-time work, and
would increase hours worked of married German women by 31 percent. Going from the current
system to one of separate taxation in these countries raises the marginal tax rate for married men.
As a consequence, male hours worked decrease. The eect is however much smaller in absolute
terms than the eect for women, amounting to a reduction of at most 60 hours, due to the lower
implied labor supply elasticity and the higher wages. Therefore, the net eects remain large in the
countries with large increases in female hours worked. Our results are in line with the description
of tax systems shown in Pearson and Binder (2011) based on OECD data. Of the countries in
our sample, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and the US exhibit a system of
joint taxation of married couples, while Greece, Hungary, Sweden and UK have a strict system of
separate taxation. Indeed, for the latter four countries we nd virtually no eects of the proposed
tax reform. The remaining countries have intermediate systems, which nevertheless create relatively
large disincentive eects for women in Belgium and Denmark.
true if we would allow for more heterogeneity.
35Figure 5: Female Employment Rate (ER) and Female Hours Worked Per Employed (HWE) under
the Current System and a System of Strictly Separate Filing
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Note: This gure shows the predicted percentage point changes in the female employment rate and changes in
female hours worked per employed when going from the current country-specic system of ling to a system
of strictly separate taxation of married couples, keeping government revenues constant. Italy is omitted (see
footnote 30 for an explanation).
Figure 5 decomposes the eect of going to separate taxation on married women's labor supply
into the extensive and the intensive margin.30 The eects of going to a system of separate ling
work along both margins, but the extensive margin eects are mainly responsible in quantitative
terms for the increase in female hours worked. For the US, the model predicts an increase in the
employment rate of married women by 6.4 percentage points, and an increase in hours worked per
employed by 25 hours. For Germany, the country with the largest overall increase, the employment
rate is predicted to rise by almost 16 percent, and hours worked per employed by 85 hours. Note
that our results are roughly similar to and only slightly smaller than the results of going to a system
of separate taxation in the US in Guner et al. (2012a), who set up a rich general equilibrium life-
cycle model that features marriage and fertility, a social security system, and labor income risk,
and calibrate it in detail to the US economy. While Guner et al. (2012a) nd that the employment
rate of married women would increase by 10.4 percent, we nd an increase of 9.2 percent, and their
predicted increase in hours worked per employed married woman of 0.3 percent compares to ours
30We omit Italy in this picture, as for Italy we get a negative eect on hours worked per employed of 40 hours.
This eect is not robust, as it does not appear in the results with country-specic calibration in Figure A.4 in the
appendix, and thus likely results from the fact that female hours worked are exactly at a non-monotonicity point in
the tax code.
36of 0.14 percent.31 It is quite reassuring that our static model gets similar results for the US than
their richer one, and the comparison conrms that our results of the labor market eects from
going to separate taxation of married couples are not unrealistically large. Figures A.3 and A.4
in the appendix show analogous results to Figures 4 and 5 if we calibrate each country separately
to match hours worked and female employment rates there, i.e. without keeping preferences at the
baseline calibration. This might be interesting, as we do not get a good hours t for all countries
in our baseline calibration. Overall, results are very robust. The most notable changes come from
Belgium, where the increase in hours worked per married woman becomes larger than 350 hours
when going to separate taxation, compared to 250 hours in the US calibration, and from Portugal,
where the increase declines from 120 hours in the US calibration to 70 hours in the country-specic
calibration.
7 Actual vs. Linear Taxes
The major novelty of our study is that we use actual non-linear tax systems rather than average
marginal tax rates as model inputs in order to predict hours worked. To understand how important
this is, we compare our results to results from a model where simple linear taxes are used as inputs.
Specically, we compare our results from the ones that we obtain if we use the linear tax rates
calculated by McDaniel (2011) and Ragan (2013) as model inputs.32 When we use these linear tax
rates, we recalibrate the model in order to still match the moments for the US.
As Table 9 shows in the rst three columns, predicted hours worked of married men are very
similar whether we use the full schedule of non-linear or simple linear labor income taxes. Married
men make up the majority of the workforce, and thus average labor income tax rates capture their
actual income tax rates very well.
For women, however, results are very dierent whether we use the actual non-linear tax code
or simple linear taxes. The model with linear taxes always predicts larger hours worked dierences
between Europe and the US than the model with actual taxes. This is not surprising, since our
decomposition in Table 7 showed signicant disincentive eects of average tax rates in Europe also
for married women. The countervailing eects of the tax structure are missing entirely when we
use simple linear tax rates. As a consequence of the larger predicted dierences, the model with
linear taxes performs much worse than the benchmark model in replicating female hours worked in
Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, where it predicts dierences of 16 and 28 percent, respectively,
compared to the US. For Western Europe, on the rst view it appears that the model with linear
taxes performs better than the model with non-linear taxes. However, this comes from the fact that
31Note that Figure 5 shows percentage point increases, but Guner et al. (2012a) report percent increases.
32McDaniel (2011) and Ragan (2013) multiply average labor income tax rates (but not social security contribution
rates) by a factor of 1.6 in order to convert them into average marginal tax rates. Ohanian et al. (2008) do not
multiply by 1.6, while Prescott (2004) multiplies the sum of labor income and social security contribution rates by
1.6.
37Table 9: Hours Worked Per Person Dierences Relative to the US with Actual and Linear Taxes
Men Women
Taxes Taxes
Country Data Actual Linear Data Actual Linear
Czech Republic  0:04  0:01  0:06 0:02  0:01  0:16
Hungary  0:16  0:11  0:10  0:04  0:01  0:16
Poland  0:14  0:04  0:05  0:05  0:13  0:16
Mean -0:11 -0:06 -0:07 -0:03 -0:05 -0:16
Norway  0:18  0:10  0:08  0:13  0:05  0:19
Sweden  0:16  0:13  0:16  0:04  0:08  0:37
Mean -0:17 -0:11 -0:12 -0:09 -0:06 -0:28
Austria  0:07  0:09  0:11  0:22  0:06  0:29
Belgium  0:13  0:14  0:14  0:20  0:29  0:30
France  0:16  0:02  0:11  0:16  0:13  0:30
Germany  0:14  0:08  0:09  0:34  0:29  0:26
Ireland  0:05  0:05  0:03  0:34  0:19  0:22
Netherlands  0:10  0:10  0:08  0:38  0:14  0:24
United Kingdom  0:07  0:04  0:05  0:19  0:11  0:25
Mean -0:10 -0:08 -0:09 -0:26 -0:17 -0:27
Greece  0:02  0:04  0:02  0:21  0:07  0:29
Italy  0:14  0:11  0:12  0:39  0:10  0:25
Spain  0:12 0:02  0:02  0:33  0:19  0:35
Mean -0:09 -0:04 -0:05 -0:31 -0:12 -0:29
the former sometimes over- and sometimes underpredicts dierences to the US, while our benchmark
model always underpredicts with the exception of Belgium. Judged by the mean absolute deviation
between model and data, both models perform equally well for Western Europe, but our benchmark
model performs better in explaining variation within Western Europe, creating a correlation of .27
between model and data within Western Europe, compared to a correlation of -.74 when using linear
tax rates. Only for Southern Europe does the model with linear tax rates perform better than the
benchmark model: as the countervailing eect of separate taxation is missing in the former, it
creates larger female hours worked dierences to the US than the benchmark model. Overall, the
model with linear tax rates does a worse job in explaining cross-country dierences: the correlation
38in female hours worked per person between data and model amounts to only .32 when linear taxes
are applied, as compared to 0.56 in the benchmark case. The model with linear taxes also performs
worse for Denmark and Portugal. It predicts 37 and 23 percent lower hours worked in Denmark
and Portugal, respectively, than in the US, while our benchmark model predicts 26 and 18 percent
lower hours worked of married women.
We also compare the US time-series prediction of the model with linear taxes to the benchmark
model (results available from the authors upon request). Contrary to the data, the model with
linear taxes predicts male hours worked to be 140 hours higher in 1979 than in 2008, whereas the
actual male hours in 1979 were only 50 hours higher. Similarly, the t for the female employment
rate is also worse than in the benchmark model: in the data, the employment rate is 15 percentage
points higher in the late 2000s than in the 70s, which is perfectly replicated by the benchmark
model, while the model with linear taxes would predict an increase of only 11 percentage points.
The t of female hours worked per employed is similar to the benchmark model.
8 Alternative Specications
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks. As in the previous section, in all of
them we recalibrate the model to match the targeted moments.
8.1 The Eect of Children
In Section 3, we already discussed that dierential eects of children on married women's labor
supply are not a major driving force of the dierences that we see in the data. Table 10 repeats in
columns 2 and 3 the benchmark results, and compares them in columns 4 and 5 to data and model
for women without children in preschool or school age. In the model, we then also assume that no
children are present in the household when calculating taxes.
As a comparison of the data in columns 2 and 4 shows, the dierences in hours worked relative
to the US do not change much when we focus on childless women, but labor supply increases in
Western Europe relative to the US. The model predicts minimally smaller dierences to the US for
married women when we simulate only households without children. Overall, the model t thus
remains similar, and even slightly improves for Western and Eastern Europe. We also investigated
dierences in the data if rather than excluding women and men with children we regress hours
worked on dummies for the presence of children in the household and predict hours setting the
dummies equal to zero, and results are very similar.
8.2 Further Robustness Checks
We perform two further robustness checks. First, we change the curvature parameter  on the
disutility of working only for women to 1 and 1.5, thereby increasing the female labor supply
39Table 10: Labor Supply Relative to the US { Benchmark vs. Childless Women
Benchmark Without Children
Country Group Data Model Data Model
HWPm Eastern Europe  0:11  0:06  0:14  0:04
Scandinavia  0:17  0:11 { {
Western Europe  0:10  0:08  0:10  0:07
Southern Europe  0:09  0:04  0:09  0:04
HWPf Eastern Europe  0:03  0:05  0:05  0:04
Scandinavia  0:09  0:06 { {
Western Europe  0:26  0:17  0:22  0:17
Southern Europe  0:31  0:12  0:32  0:11
ERf Eastern Europe  0:02  0:02 0:00  0:02
Scandinavia 0:13  0:02 { {
Western Europe 0:01  0:07 0:00  0:08
Southern Europe  0:15  0:08  0:17  0:08
HWEf Eastern Europe 0:00  0:03  0:04  0:03
Scandinavia  0:23  0:03 { {
Western Europe  0:27  0:08  0:22  0:07
Southern Europe  0:12  0:01  0:13 0:00
elasticity. We leave the value for men at 0.5. Table A.17 in the appendix shows the results.
Changing the female elasticity has almost no eect on male labor supply. For married women,
increasing the elasticity increases the eects of any cross-country dierences, and therefore increases
the dierence between hours worked in the US and Europe. This leads to a worsening of the t
for Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, but an improved t for Western Europe. The eect of the
elasticity on female hours worked is quite small and comes almost exclusively through the intensive
margin, but is absent there for Southern Europe.
Secondly, we vary the redistribution scheme of government revenues. In the benchmark anal-
ysis, we assume full redistribution, while here we consider two alternative redistribution schemes:
rst, the alternative extreme of no redistribution, i.e. i = 0, or secondly, a specication similar
to the one used by Prescott (2004), namely setting i equal to 1 minus twice the share of expen-
ditures on military from all government expenditures. Redistribution matters in the analysis, as
the redistribution of tax revenues in a lump-sum fashion to households provides important income
eects that lower the incentives to work.
As Table A.18 in the appendix shows, compared to the benchmark scenario a scenario with
no redistribution of government revenues leads to signicantly higher predicted hours worked in
40Europe. This lowers the model-predicted US-European dierence and even turns it positive for
married women in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. In the benchmark scenario, the income eect
from redistribution is on average larger in Europe than in the US due to higher taxes and therefore
higher government revenues in Europe. This leads to larger disincentive eects on labor supply
from redistribution in Europe than in the US, which are absent in the case of no redistribution.
Going from the benchmark redistribution to the country-specic redistribution scheme used by
Prescott (2004) decreases hours worked for men and women in Europe relative to the US more than
in the benchmark. Due to the higher military expenses in the US than in Europe, a lower share
of government revenues is redistributed in the US, which makes the income eect of high taxes via
transfers even larger in Europe. Comparing the benchmark to the Prescott redistribution scenario,
the t is always slightly worse in the benchmark scenario for married men, as well for married
women in Southern and Western Europe, but is slightly better for married women in Scandinavia
and Eastern Europe.
9 Conclusion
Relying on three micro data sets, we document average hours worked of married couples for a
sample of eighteen European countries and the US over the time period 2001 to 2008. We nd that
hours worked vary signicantly across countries, and the largest variations can be found for married
women. Whereas European married men work relatively homogeneously between 9 and 17 percent
fewer hours than US married men, the picture for married women is much more heterogeneous,
with Eastern European and Scandinavian married women working only 3 and 9 percent fewer hours
than US married women, but Western and Southern European women working 26 and 31 percent
fewer hours.
We investigate in how far international dierences in consumption taxes, labor income tax
systems, gender wage gaps and educational premia, and the educational composition and matching
into couples can quantitatively account for the international dierences in hours worked by married
couples. We do this in the context of a static model of joint labor supply, holding preferences
constant across countries. The model only slightly underpredicts the observed international hours
dierences for married men. Moreover, it does a good job in explaining international dierences in
hours worked by married women. Specically, the model is able to replicate the low hours worked
per married woman dierences between the US and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, as well as the
large dierences between the US and Western Europe. Only for Southern Europe can the model
only explain 40 percent of the observed dierence.
A decomposition analysis shows that consumption taxes oer signicant disincentives to work
in all European countries and for both sexes. The eect of non-linear labor income taxes is however
much more complicated: for married men, labor income taxes always predict lower hours worked
in Europe than in the US, which is however not true for married women. While the on average
41higher tax rates in Europe also provide a disincentive eect for married women, the tax structure
is often more favorable for European women than for US ones, since the US features a system of
joint taxation of married couples. We nd that going from the current tax system to a system of
strictly separate taxation of married couples would increase hours worked of married women by
around 300 hours in Germany, and by between 100 and 250 hours in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland,
the US, France, and Portugal.
The model that we use in this paper is a very simple one. It does e.g. not incorporate a
home production sector in competition with the service sector of the economy, a subsistence level
of consumption, a life cycle component, or income risk. The success of the model is thus quite
remarkable. While the model results leave some scope for other factors explaining hours worked
of married women, they come quite close to replicating the data. Taxes and wages thus have large
explanatory power for international dierences in hours worked of married women. It is however
crucial to model non-linear labor income tax systems in order to replicate the behavior of married
women. The origins of the dierent decomposition into the extensive and the intensive margin for
married women in Scandinavia and Western Europe remain as an open question for future research.
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44A Appendix
A.1 Data Issues
For data reasons detailed in Bick et al. (2014), we exclude the years 2001 for the UK and 2005
for Spain from the analysis. Furthermore, we exclude the year 2001 for Italy and the year 2008
for Ireland because the OECD TaxBen Module does not produce the corresponding tax rates. We
exclude households in the ELFS of which at least one member lives in an institution, since the CPS
does not cover individuals living in institutions. This leads to the deletion of a negligent number
of observations. A detailed description of all issues involving setting up the data sets can be found
in Bick et al. (2014).
45A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Fraction of Married Women (Ages 25-54)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
W
o
m
e
n
 
Eastern Europe
Scandinavia
Western Europe
Southern Europe
US CZHU PL DKNO SE AT BE DE FR IE NLUK ES GR IT PT
Figure A.2: Employment Rates (ER) and Hours Worked per Employed (HWE) of Married Men
(Ages 25-54)
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46Figure A.3: Joint vs. Separate Filing { Hours Worked per Person (HWP) { Country Calibration
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Figure A.4: Joint vs. Separate Filing { Female Employment Rate (ER) and Female Hours Worked
Per Employed (HWE) { Country Calibration
−
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
H
W
E
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
−
3
0
3
6
9
1
2
1
5
1
8
2
1
2
4
2
7
E
R
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
US CZ HU PL DK NO SE AT BE DE FR IE NL UK ES GR IT PT
ER Difference HWE Difference
47A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Share of Observations Dropped from the Sample
Country Men Women
Czech Repbulic 0:056 0:125
Hungary 0:066 0:133
Poland 0:135 0:193
Mean 0:086 0:151
Denmark 0:007 0:006
Norway 0:012 0:017
Sweden 0:005 0:005
Mean 0:008 0:010
Austria 0:067 0:135
Belgium 0:073 0:146
France 0:044 0:095
Germany 0:079 0:147
Ireland 0:067 0:114
Netherlands 0:038 0:096
United Kingdom 0:086 0:135
Mean 0:065 0:124
Greece 0:052 0:183
Italy 0:047 0:146
Portugal 0:080 0:154
Spain 0:047 0:121
Mean 0:057 0:151
United States 0:069 0:102
48Table A.2: Hours Worked per Person by Gender and Marital Status
Men Women
Country Married Single Married Single
Czech Repbulic 1899:6 1633:8 1256:7 1310:6
Hungary 1659:5 1460:6 1182:9 1298:0
Poland 1694:7 1301:7 1170:2 1210:0
Mean 1751:3 1465:4 1203:3 1272:9
Denmark 1717:7 1452:0 1218:3 1108:9
Norway 1622:9 1409:2 1070:7 1074:7
Sweden 1645:6 1475:5 1179:7 1153:4
Mean 1662:1 1445:6 1156:2 1112:3
Austria 1826:4 1626:8 969:4 1296:2
Belgium 1716:1 1459:6 987:7 1180:6
France 1656:0 1398:2 1031:6 1113:3
Germany 1690:8 1400:5 809:8 1260:3
Ireland 1878:7 1619:5 809:8 1275:2
Netherlands 1780:3 1613:8 763:7 1216:6
United Kingdom 1826:6 1544:7 994:3 1170:2
Mean 1767:9 1523:3 909:5 1216:1
Greece 1923:2 1628:0 979:3 1264:1
Italy 1689:7 1354:9 748:4 1041:7
Portugal 1770:3 1358:2 1266:9 1297:9
Spain 1740:0 1419:0 832:7 1212:8
Mean 1780:8 1440:0 956:8 1204:1
United States 1970:4 1565:3 1235:0 1422:0
Mean 1761:6 1484:5 1028:2 1217:0
Standard Deviation 104:2 108:8 179:5 96:6
Coecient of Variation 0:059 0:073 0:175 0:079
Var(log hours) 0:003 0:005 0:033 0:006
49Table A.3: Employment Rate (ER) and Hours Worked per Employed (HWE) of Married Women
Country ERf HWEf
Czech Repbulic 73:6 1706:4
Hungary 66:3 1784:7
Poland 66:6 1758:7
Mean 68:8 1749:9
Denmark 83:6 1456:5
Norway 82:6 1295:5
Sweden 84:4 1396:9
Mean 83:6 1383:0
Austria 74:0 1310:2
Belgium 70:7 1395:3
France 73:4 1405:2
Germany 71:4 1134:9
Ireland 62:0 1306:0
Netherlands 74:6 1022:4
United Kingdom 76:8 1295:4
Mean 71:8 1267:1
Greece 56:3 1740:6
Italy 54:6 1370:8
Portugal 76:0 1665:9
Spain 55:0 1518:5
Mean 60:5 1573:9
United States 70:7 1745:8
Mean 70:7 1461:6
Standard Deviation 9:2 227:3
Coecient of Variation 0:130 0:155
50Table A.4: Labor Supply of Married Women Relative to the US { All Women (Raw) and Women
Without Children
HWPf ERf HWEf
Country Raw w/o Kids Raw w/o Kids Raw w/o Kids
Czech Repbulic 0:02 0:05 0:03 0:10  0:02  0:06
Hungary  0:04  0:04  0:04  0:01 0:02  0:03
Poland  0:05  0:16  0:04  0:10 0:01  0:04
Mean -0:03 -0:05 -0:02 0:00 0:00 -0:04
Austria  0:22  0:16 0:03 0:02  0:25  0:17
Belgium  0:20  0:33 0:00  0:10  0:20  0:23
France  0:16  0:22 0:03 0:00  0:20  0:22
Germany  0:34  0:22 0:01 0:02  0:35  0:24
Ireland  0:34  0:19  0:09  0:03  0:25  0:16
Netherlands  0:38  0:34 0:04  0:01  0:41  0:33
United Kingdom  0:19  0:09 0:06 0:07  0:26  0:17
Mean -0:26 -0:22 0:01 0:00 -0:27 -0:22
Greece  0:21  0:28  0:14  0:19 0:00  0:05
Italy  0:39  0:36  0:16  0:15  0:22  0:21
Portugal 0:03  0:13 0:05  0:02  0:05  0:10
Spain  0:33  0:33  0:16  0:17  0:13  0:14
Mean -0:23 -0:28 -0:10 -0:13 -0:10 -0:13
51Table A.5: Labor Supply of Married Men and Women Relative to the US { All (Raw) and Excluding
Unemployed Individuals
HWPm HWPf ERf
Country Raw w/o UE Raw w/o UE Raw w/o UE
Czech Repbulic  0:04  0:03 0:02 0:06 0:03 0:06
Hungary  0:16  0:15  0:04  0:02  0:04  0:03
Poland  0:14  0:08  0:05 0:04  0:04 0:03
Mean -0:11 -0:09 -0:03 0:03 -0:02 0:02
Denmark  0:13  0:13  0:01  0:01 0:13 0:14
Norway  0:18  0:19  0:13  0:14 0:12 0:12
Sweden  0:16  0:16  0:04  0:03 0:14 0:15
Mean -0:16 -0:16 -0:06 -0:06 0:13 0:13
Austria  0:07  0:07  0:22  0:21 0:03 0:04
Belgium  0:13  0:12  0:20  0:18 0:00 0:02
France  0:16  0:15  0:16  0:13 0:03 0:06
Germany  0:14  0:11  0:34  0:32 0:01 0:04
Ireland  0:05  0:05  0:34  0:34  0:09  0:09
Netherlands  0:10  0:11  0:38  0:38 0:04 0:04
United Kingdom  0:07  0:08  0:19  0:19 0:06 0:06
Mean -0:10 -0:10 -0:26 -0:25 0:01 0:03
Greece  0:02  0:03  0:21  0:16  0:14  0:12
Italy  0:14  0:14  0:39  0:37  0:16  0:15
Portugal  0:10  0:09 0:03 0:06 0:05 0:08
Spain  0:12  0:10  0:33  0:28  0:16  0:13
Mean -0:10 -0:09 -0:23 -0:19 -0:10 -0:08
52Table A.6: Demographic Composition
Low Education High Education
Country Men Women Men Women Assortative Matching
Czech Repbulic 4:6 9:2 15:6 12:1 0:46
Hungary 14:1 20:8 16:5 18:9 0:55
Poland 9:8 10:8 14:9 18:9 0:52
Mean 9:5 13:6 15:7 16:7 0:51
Denmark 15:9 19:3 31:7 35:6 0:39
Norway 12:7 13:9 35:2 38:3 0:40
Sweden 16:8 13:9 27:9 37:1 0:38
Mean 15:1 15:7 31:6 37:0 0:39
Austria 12:7 23:8 21:1 14:7 0:39
Belgium 32:0 28:7 31:4 34:7 0:55
France 28:1 29:7 24:8 28:0 0:48
Germany 10:5 16:4 31:6 20:5 0:50
Ireland 35:6 27:7 28:7 29:7 0:52
Netherlands 25:5 28:9 30:7 24:5 0:44
United Kingdom 22:1 29:4 33:0 33:0 0:40
Mean 23:8 26:4 28:8 26:4 0:47
Greece 38:4 34:4 23:3 21:4 0:63
Italy 50:7 45:8 10:7 12:1 0:54
Portugal 78:1 72:6 9:6 13:8 0:62
Spain 52:0 50:8 27:0 27:8 0:53
Mean 54:8 50:9 17:6 18:8 0:58
United States 9:3 7:8 43:3 45:7 0:54
Note: The last column shows the correlation coecient of a simple correlation between the
education level of husbands and wives. Data for Scandinavia in the last column come from
EU-SILC.
53Table A.7: Targeted Female Employment Rates
Data Model Data-Model
Low educated husband
Low educated woman 42:4 44:3  1:9
Medium educated woman 63:3 60:3 2:9
High educated woman 76:1 77:6  1:5
Mean 60:6 60:7 -0:1
Medium educated husband
Low educated woman 48:4 50:1  1:8
Medium educated woman 71:2 68:6 2:6
High educated woman 83:2 85:7  2:5
Mean 67:6 68:1 -0:5
High educated husband
Low educated woman 49:6 51:7  2:2
Medium educated woman 66:2 62:9 3:3
High educated woman 73:7 74:9  1:2
Mean 63:2 63:2 0:0
54Table A.8: Decomposition of Male Hours Worked per Person Relative to the US
Country Data Model l c w l + c + w
Czech Republic  0:04  0:01 0:00  0:02  0:01  0:02
Hungary  0:16  0:11  0:11  0:04  0:04  0:13
Poland  0:14  0:04  0:01  0:03  0:03  0:06
Mean -0:11 -0:06 -0:04 -0:03 -0:03 -0:07
Norway  0:18  0:10  0:06  0:04 0:01  0:10
Sweden  0:16  0:13  0:08  0:06 0:01  0:13
Mean -0:17 -0:11 -0:07 -0:05 0:01 -0:12
Austria  0:07  0:09  0:09  0:03  0:01  0:11
Belgium  0:13  0:14  0:13  0:03  0:02  0:15
France  0:16  0:02 0:00  0:04  0:01  0:04
Germany  0:14  0:08  0:07  0:02 0:01  0:08
Ireland  0:05  0:05  0:03  0:04  0:01  0:07
Netherlands  0:10  0:10  0:08  0:03 0:00  0:11
United Kingdom  0:07  0:04  0:03  0:02 0:01  0:04
Mean -0:10 -0:08 -0:06 -0:03 -0:01 -0:09
Greece  0:02  0:04  0:02  0:02 0:00  0:05
Italy  0:14  0:11  0:08  0:03  0:03  0:12
Spain  0:12 0:02 0:00  0:02 0:01  0:01
Mean -0:09 -0:04 -0:03 -0:02 -0:01 -0:06
55Table A.9: Decomposition of Female Hours Worked per Person Relative to the US
Country Data Model l c w l + c + w
Czech Republic 0:02  0:02 0:00  0:05 0:01  0:02
Hungary  0:04  0:01 0:10  0:09 0:01  0:06
Poland  0:05  0:13  0:02  0:07  0:03  0:10
Mean -0:03 -0:05 0:03 -0:07 0:00 -0:06
Norway  0:13  0:05 0:00  0:10 0:04  0:04
Sweden  0:04  0:08 0:02  0:15 0:03  0:08
Mean -0:09 -0:06 0:01 -0:12 0:03 -0:06
Austria  0:22  0:06 0:01  0:07 0:04  0:02
Belgium  0:20  0:29  0:23  0:08 0:09  0:22
France  0:16  0:13 0:00  0:10 0:04  0:06
Germany  0:34  0:29  0:24  0:05 0:01  0:27
Ireland  0:34  0:19 0:02  0:10  0:04  0:12
Netherlands  0:38  0:14  0:06  0:09 0:03  0:08
United Kingdom  0:19  0:11 0:05  0:06  0:01  0:02
Mean -0:26 -0:17 -0:06 -0:08 0:02 -0:11
Greece  0:21  0:07 0:12  0:05  0:08 0:02
Italy  0:39  0:10  0:02  0:09 0:06  0:03
Spain  0:33  0:19 0:11  0:05  0:08  0:01
Mean -0:31 -0:12 0:07 -0:06 -0:03 -0:01
56Table A.10: Decomposition of Female Employment Rate Relative to the US
Country Data Model l c w l + c + w
Czech Republic 0:03  0:02 0:00  0:02 0:00  0:01
Hungary  0:04 0:03 0:07  0:04 0:01 0:02
Poland  0:04  0:07  0:01  0:03  0:01  0:05
Mean -0:02 -0:02 0:02 -0:03 0:00 -0:01
Norway 0:12  0:01 0:02  0:04 0:02  0:01
Sweden 0:14  0:03 0:03  0:06 0:02  0:02
Mean 0:13 -0:02 0:02 -0:05 0:02 -0:02
Austria 0:03 0:00 0:04  0:03 0:02 0:02
Belgium 0:00  0:12  0:07  0:03 0:04  0:08
France 0:03  0:08 0:00  0:04 0:02  0:03
Germany 0:01  0:14  0:10  0:02 0:01  0:12
Ireland  0:09  0:08 0:04  0:04  0:02  0:02
Netherlands 0:04  0:07 0:00  0:04 0:02  0:03
United Kingdom 0:06  0:04 0:04  0:03 0:00 0:01
Mean 0:01 -0:07 -0:01 -0:03 0:01 -0:03
Greece  0:14  0:05 0:07  0:02  0:04 0:02
Italy  0:16  0:06 0:01  0:04 0:03 0:00
Spain  0:16  0:13 0:05  0:02  0:04  0:01
Mean -0:15 -0:08 0:04 -0:03 -0:01 0:01
57Table A.11: Decomposition of Female Hours Worked per Employed Relative to the US
Country Data Model l c w l + c + w
Czech Republic  0:02 0:01 0:01  0:02 0:00 0:00
Hungary 0:02  0:06 0:00  0:04 0:00  0:09
Poland 0:01  0:04 0:00  0:03  0:01  0:03
Mean 0:00 -0:03 0:00 -0:03 0:00 -0:04
Norway  0:26  0:03  0:02  0:04 0:01  0:03
Sweden  0:20  0:04  0:02  0:06 0:01  0:05
Mean -0:23 -0:03 -0:02 -0:05 0:01 -0:04
Austria  0:25  0:07  0:05  0:03 0:01  0:05
Belgium  0:20  0:14  0:14  0:03 0:03  0:12
France  0:20  0:02 0:00  0:04 0:01  0:02
Germany  0:35  0:12  0:11  0:02 0:00  0:13
Ireland  0:25  0:08  0:04  0:04  0:01  0:09
Netherlands  0:41  0:04  0:05  0:04 0:01  0:04
United Kingdom  0:26  0:06 0:00  0:02  0:01  0:04
Mean -0:27 -0:08 -0:06 -0:03 0:01 -0:07
Greece 0:00 0:00 0:02  0:02  0:03  0:01
Italy  0:22  0:01  0:03  0:04 0:02  0:03
Spain  0:13  0:01 0:04  0:02  0:03  0:01
Mean -0:12 -0:01 0:01 -0:03 -0:02 -0:02
58Table A.12: Decomposition Relative to the US { Tax Structure and Tax Level with 
Country Group Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
HWPm Eastern Europe  0:11  0:04  0:04 0:00
Scandinavia  0:17  0:07  0:05  0:02
Western Europe  0:10  0:06  0:05  0:01
Southern Europe  0:09  0:03  0:03 0:00
HWPf Eastern Europe  0:03 0:03 0:02 0:00
Scandinavia  0:09 0:01 0:08  0:06
Western Europe  0:26  0:06  0:04  0:03
Southern Europe  0:31 0:07 0:07 0:00
ERf Eastern Europe  0:02 0:02 0:02 0:00
Scandinavia 0:13 0:02 0:05  0:03
Western Europe 0:01  0:01 0:00  0:01
Southern Europe  0:15 0:04 0:04 0:00
HWEf Eastern Europe 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Scandinavia  0:23  0:02 0:00  0:02
Western Europe  0:27  0:06  0:04  0:01
Southern Europe  0:12 0:01 0:01 0:00
59Table A.13: Decomposition of Male Hours Worked per Person Relative to the US { Tax Structure
and Level
Country Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
Czech Republic  0:04 0:00  0:02 0:02
Hungary  0:16  0:11  0:16 0:05
Poland  0:14  0:01 0:03  0:04
Mean -0:11 -0:04 -0:05 0:01
Norway  0:18  0:06  0:04  0:03
Sweden  0:16  0:08  0:04  0:03
Mean -0:17 -0:07 -0:04 -0:03
Austria  0:07  0:09  0:07  0:02
Belgium  0:13  0:13  0:07  0:05
France  0:16 0:00 0:01  0:01
Germany  0:14  0:07  0:02  0:05
Ireland  0:05  0:03  0:08 0:05
Netherlands  0:10  0:08  0:04  0:05
United Kingdom  0:07  0:03  0:03 0:00
Mean -0:10 -0:06 -0:04 -0:02
Greece  0:02  0:02  0:02 0:00
Italy  0:14  0:08  0:06  0:02
Spain  0:12 0:00  0:01 0:02
Mean -0:09 -0:03 -0:03 0:00
60Table A.14: Decomposition of Female Hours Worked per Person Relative to the US { Tax Structure
and Level
Country Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
Czech Republic 0:02 0:00  0:05 0:05
Hungary  0:04 0:10 0:01 0:09
Poland  0:05  0:02 0:08  0:10
Mean -0:03 0:03 0:02 0:01
Norway  0:13 0:00 0:06  0:06
Sweden  0:04 0:02 0:10  0:08
Mean -0:09 0:01 0:08 -0:07
Austria  0:22 0:01 0:03  0:02
Belgium  0:20  0:23  0:10  0:13
France  0:16 0:00 0:02  0:02
Germany  0:34  0:24  0:13  0:11
Ireland  0:34 0:02  0:09 0:10
Netherlands  0:38  0:06 0:05  0:11
United Kingdom  0:19 0:05 0:06  0:01
Mean -0:26 -0:06 -0:02 -0:04
Greece  0:21 0:12 0:12 0:00
Italy  0:39  0:02 0:03  0:05
Spain  0:33 0:11 0:07 0:04
Mean -0:31 0:07 0:07 0:00
61Table A.15: Decomposition of Female Employment Rate Relative to the US { Tax Structure and
Level
Country Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
Czech Republic 0:03 0:00  0:03 0:02
Hungary  0:04 0:07 0:04 0:04
Poland  0:04  0:01 0:03  0:04
Mean -0:02 0:02 0:01 0:01
Norway 0:12 0:02 0:04  0:03
Sweden 0:14 0:03 0:06  0:03
Mean 0:13 0:02 0:05 -0:03
Austria 0:03 0:04 0:05  0:01
Belgium 0:00  0:07  0:03  0:04
France 0:03 0:00 0:01  0:01
Germany 0:01  0:10  0:05  0:05
Ireland  0:09 0:04 0:00 0:04
Netherlands 0:04 0:00 0:04  0:04
United Kingdom 0:06 0:04 0:04 0:00
Mean 0:01 -0:01 0:01 -0:02
Greece  0:14 0:07 0:07 0:00
Italy  0:16 0:01 0:03  0:02
Spain  0:16 0:05 0:03 0:02
Mean -0:15 0:04 0:04 0:00
62Table A.16: Decomposition of Female Hours Worked per Employed Relative to the US { Tax
Structure and Level
Country Data l Tax Structure Tax Level
Czech Republic  0:02 0:01  0:01 0:02
Hungary 0:02 0:00  0:04 0:04
Poland 0:01 0:00 0:04  0:04
Mean 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01
Norway  0:26  0:02 0:00  0:02
Sweden  0:20  0:02 0:01  0:03
Mean -0:23 -0:02 0:00 -0:03
Austria  0:25  0:05  0:04  0:01
Belgium  0:20  0:14  0:06  0:08
France  0:20 0:00 0:01  0:01
Germany  0:35  0:11  0:06  0:05
Ireland  0:25  0:04  0:09 0:05
Netherlands  0:41  0:05 0:00  0:05
United Kingdom  0:26 0:00 0:00 0:00
Mean -0:27 -0:06 -0:03 -0:02
Greece 0:00 0:02 0:02 0:00
Italy  0:22  0:03  0:01  0:02
Spain  0:13 0:04 0:02 0:02
Mean -0:12 0:01 0:01 0:00
63Table A.17: Labor Supply Relative to the US { Dierent Female Elasticities
Country Group Data Benchmark f = 1:0 f = 1:5
HWPm Eastern Europe  0:11  0:06  0:05  0:05
Scandinavia  0:17  0:11  0:12  0:12
Western Europe  0:10  0:08  0:07  0:07
Southern Europe  0:09  0:04  0:05  0:05
HWPf Eastern Europe  0:03  0:05  0:06  0:06
Scandinavia  0:09  0:06  0:06  0:07
Western Europe  0:26  0:17  0:20  0:23
Southern Europe  0:31  0:12  0:11  0:11
ERf Eastern Europe  0:02  0:02  0:01  0:01
Scandinavia 0:13  0:02  0:01  0:01
Western Europe 0:01  0:07  0:06  0:06
Southern Europe  0:15  0:08  0:08  0:08
HWEf Eastern Europe 0:00  0:03  0:04  0:05
Scandinavia  0:23  0:03  0:05  0:06
Western Europe  0:27  0:08  0:12  0:16
Southern Europe  0:12  0:01 0:00  0:01
64Table A.18: Labor Supply Relative to the US { No and Prescott Redistribution
Country Group Data Benchmark No Redistribution Prescott
HWPm Eastern Europe  0:11  0:06  0:02  0:07
Scandinavia  0:17  0:11  0:06  0:12
Western Europe  0:10  0:08  0:03  0:09
Southern Europe  0:09  0:04  0:01  0:06
HWPf Eastern Europe  0:03  0:05 0:03  0:09
Scandinavia  0:09  0:06 0:13  0:09
Western Europe  0:26  0:17  0:08  0:20
Southern Europe  0:31  0:12  0:07  0:15
ERf Eastern Europe  0:02  0:02 0:02  0:03
Scandinavia 0:13  0:02 0:07  0:03
Western Europe 0:01  0:07  0:03  0:09
Southern Europe  0:15  0:08  0:06  0:09
HWEf Eastern Europe 0:00  0:03 0:01  0:04
Scandinavia  0:23  0:03 0:04  0:04
Western Europe  0:27  0:08  0:03  0:09
Southern Europe  0:12  0:01 0:02  0:02
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